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Abstract:
This thesis aims to explore the far-reaching effects of armored warfare and tank
development on the outcome of the Eastern Front of the Second World War, where Nazi
Germany and the United Soviet Socialist Republics fought an existential war that would decide
the destiny of Eastern Europe. As such, this thesis provides background information on the Nazi
ideology that opened this theater of the Second World War before delving into German tank
development, examining several vehicles that had a significant impact on armored development
in general as well as within the theater when these vehicles raged across the steppes of Russia and
Ukraine. The perspective then changes to cover the Soviet response to the invasion, the general
flow of the war in this theater after Operation Barbarossa, culminating with the Battle of Berlin.
Several important facets of this front such as the Soviet implementation of Deep Battle
philosophy and the evacuation of Soviet war industry to the Ural Mountains is also covered.
Finally, common trends in Soviet armor that allowed their tanks and other armored vehicles to
prevail over Nazi Germany will be discussed, and an overview of several significant Soviet
armored vehicles ranging from self-propelled guns to an assortment of tank destroyers and the
vaunted T-34 and IS-2 medium and heavy tanks is also explored.
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In the waning days of the First World War, a new weapon emerged that would
change ground warfare forever. The tank, built to break the stalemate of trench warfare,
had entered the battlefield. Lumbering vehicles boasting tracked propulsion, armored
plating, and multiple weapon emplacements, tanks presented a terrifying visage that
hailed the mechanization of warfare in the modern era. These new metal monsters were
the mechanized iteration of cavalries of ages past and would rapidly carve out a niche for
themselves on the battlefields of western Europe. Although traditional cavalry still had a
minor role on this modern battlefield, they would ultimately be supplanted by these new
machines. Nevertheless, tanks were still a new force on the battlefield whose potential
had not been fully realized. The Second World War would change this paradigm
dramatically.
Though primarily fielded by the western Allies during World War 1, these new
weapons did not go unnoticed by other nations. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union
invested heavily in developing armor doctrine in the interwar period, with devastating
results. Once World War 2 began, Nazi Germany possessed impressive armored forces
and had integrated them into traditional battle tactics to form a powerful combined arms
strategy that took western Europe by surprise. Turning his attentions to the east, Adolf
Hitler saw an opportunity to expand his Reich into Eastern Europe and Russia. Intent on
violently expanding the lands under its control, Nazi Germany invaded the USSR with
huge numbers of tanks and other armored vehicles forming the vanguard of his force.
Hitler planned to quickly occupy the western reaches of the Soviet Union and kill or
enslave every man woman and child of the Slavic peoples, whom he considered
untermenschen, or sub-humans. This was in Hitler’s mind a vernichtungskrieg, or war of
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extermination against the Soviet peoples, designed to violently depopulate their lands to
make room for the envisioned Greater Germanic Reich.
The Soviet Union however, did not surrender as quickly as anticipated. Despite
Nazi Germany’s superior tactics and training the USSR possessed the world’s largest
tank forces at the outset of hostilities, with thousands of light tanks as well as newer,
heavier vehicles such as the early model T-34. These new tanks caught the Nazis by
surprise, and although they failed to significantly slow the Axis’ momentum, the
existence of these vehicles set off an arms race between the Soviet Union and Nazi
Germany. As the war raged both sides mass-produced significantly better armed and
armored tanks and other fighting vehicles that caused a paradigm shift in armored
warfare as a direct result of this conflict.
Though the fighting on the Eastern Front during the Second World War is far too
grand in scale to examine every facet in detail in this thesis, the following will provide an
overview of the armored warfare that took place there during the Second World War.
Tanks were an essential component of the ground warfare from this front throughout the
conflict, with both sides fielding vast number of tanks and other armored vehicles as the
centerpiece of their ground operations. Additionally, this theater saw significant changes
to armored doctrine and design that have affected tank development ever since and
significantly affected the outcome of the conflict on this front. The Soviet Union may
well have fallen to the Nazis had they had not focused their tank development on vehicles
such as the T-34 which used innovative and versatile designs and were cheap to produce.
Further, these designs would comprise the bulk of the Soviet Union’s tank forces by the
end of the war, supplanting older light tank designs with much more heavily armed and
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armored vehicles. Finally, the Soviet Union’s tank force had been gutted by Josef Stalin’s
purge of officers throughout the Red Army in the years prior to the Second World War,
necessitating the rediscovery of strategic-level maneuvers such as Deep Battle that
enabled the Red Army to turn the tide of war against the Wehrmacht.
To illustrate this argument, this thesis has been divided into three sections. The
first section covers the German invasion, illustrating the threat Nazi Germany posed to
the peoples of the Soviet Union with the Nazi plans to violently depopulate the lands they
conquered after pushing back the Soviet forces with coordinated use of panzer divisions
(massed armor formations). A brief introduction to tank types will be offered, as these
categories were commonly used by both the Nazis and the Soviets to classify their
vehicles and determine their use in combat. Next, a selection of significant German
vehicles will be examined, showcasing the changes the Nazis made to their armored
doctrine in this theater as the war progressed and the trend towards much heavier vehicles
by the end of the war.
The second section will focus on the Soviet response to the German invasion,
examining the reasons the Red Army suffered terrible losses in the opening months of the
war. The methods the Red Army used to turn the tide of battle via the rediscovery of
strategic-level operations that had been discarded in the wake of Stalin’s purges will also
be examined. Additionally, the preservation of Soviet war industry via evacuation to the
east will be explored alongside common design trends in Soviet armor during this period.
An overview of combat on the front as a whole with a focus on Soviet operations will
also be provided to illustrate how Soviet armored divisions contributed to the ultimate
victory in the conflict.
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The final section provided is an in-depth look at an array of Soviet armored
vehicles that were particularly essential to the war effort. This section will illustrate the
pivot away from old light tank designs to heavier vehicles like the T-34 which made use
of technological advancements such as angled armor, better engines, and higher-caliber
guns to outmaneuver and defeat their German opponents. These vehicle’s characteristics
were also optimized for mass production at a low cost and focused their efforts on being
good at multiple roles rather than the emphasis placed on heavier armor and
overengineering like their late-war German counterparts. Additionally, a look at heavy
Soviet assault guns is provided to emphasize the Soviets’ use of vehicles in multiple roles
and the cost-effective means by which they defeated the Germans, whose vehicles were
generally much more expensive to manufacture.
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Part 1: The German Invasion
The invasion of the USSR by Nazi Germany was the singular event that
kickstarted the fighting in this theater and led to millions of deaths as well as huge
advancements in armored warfare. The invading Germans were the catalyst from which
all future Soviet tank development during the war stemmed and would change the
standards by which armored warfare was conducted forever. When the Germans invaded,
they sought to conquer the lands of eastern Europe and replace the indigenous Slavic
peoples with German colonists to expand Hitler’s Reich. In order to conquer the USSR,
Hitler planned to use his armored divisions in massive combined arms offensives much
as he had in Western Europe. Once panzer divisions conquered territory, occupying
soldiers would begin killing the populace, carrying out the Nazis “Final Solution” to not
only the Jews of eastern Europe but to millions of other civilians. Millions more would be
enslaved for labor usage. None of this would have been possible without the use of
mechanized forces, which is why an overview of German tank designs as well as the
leadup to Operation Barbarossa have been provided below.
By invading the USSR, the Nazis sought to gain lebensraum, “living space” that
they felt was due to the German people, as well as conquer the Soviet agricultural and
petroleum industries to continue to feed the Nazi war machine.1 The Nazis considered the
people of the Soviet Union to be subhuman and only useful as slave labor, if not
eliminated outright as was often the case. To this effect, as the Wehrmacht invaded the
USSR, death squads, or Einsatzgruppen followed to carry out the genocide. This was

1

(Snyder 2012) 416

9

very different from the Nazi conquests in the West, where killing civilians other than
Jews was of lesser importance and the conquered populations lived under occupation
rather than being killed outright. Nevertheless, Germany’s armored divisions proved
essential in conquering as much territory as the Nazis were able to. The mechanization of
the Axis forces enabled the Wehrmacht to conquer huge amounts of territory very
quickly, leading to an unprecedented rate of advance into the Soviet heartland.
The invasion was spearheaded by three gargantuan army groups, North, Center,
and South, utilizing the strategy that would come to be known as blitzkrieg, or lightning
war.2 This strategy made use of quick, deep thrusts into enemy territory by armored
vehicles and mechanized infantry, supported by ground-attack aircraft to take and occupy
an area quickly before pushing on. As a result, the German invasion relied on vast
quantities of tanks, armored cars, half-tracks, tank destroyers, and other armored vehicles
to maintain their momentum into Soviet territory. Alongside the need for huge quantities
of armored vehicles, encounters with heavily armored Soviet vehicles such as the T-34
and KV-series heavy tanks gave German forces pause as they advanced towards Moscow
and Ukraine. This resulted in much more intense and frequent armored engagements
between German and Soviet forces and led to advances in tank design and usage that
formed the basis for modern tank warfare.
Nazi Germany began planning an invasion of the Soviet Union in 1940, following
the joint partitioning of Poland with the Soviet Union. The overarching motivations for
the invasion involved gaining territory for the envisioned “Greater Germany”, as well as
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the vast arable and industrialized regions of western Russia and Ukraine. 3 Accessing the
oil fields south of the Caucasus range to maintain Germany’s fuel supply to its armed
forces was another key objective. Developed under the codename Operation Otto,
Germany began massing panzer divisions along the Reich’s eastern border in Poland after
several months of preparatory training following German’s victories in the West against
France and the Low Countries.4
Aside from the overall objectives of the operation in gaining land and fuel
reserves for the Reich, the planned offensives were also to be an extension of Germany’s
Final Solution for the Jews of Europe. As the front advanced, the death squads would
enter occupied territory, killing thousands of civilians in mass shootings and other
barbarous execution methods. Next, concentration and extermination camps were to be
erected and millions of captured Jews and Soviet POW’s were killed as the war
progressed.5 The Hunger Plan was developed to these ends and involved the intentional
mass-starvation of millions of people in the Nazi-occupied regions of the USSR, while
the food they had been growing was to be sent back to Germany.6 Given these objectives,
it is clear that Nazi German was waging a war of complete annihilation against the Soviet
Union, necessitating drastic measures be taken for the survival of the Soviet peoples.
Germany’s rapid mechanized advance into Soviet territory would necessitate sweeping
changes to Soviet armored doctrine to combat this existential threat.

3
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The Wehrmacht’s use of the panzer division formed a central component of the
blitzkrieg strategy and arguably proved to be a fundamental change in the use of tanks in
war. Additionally, this level of mass-organization of armor was the chief factor in the
Wehrmacht’s ability to conquer Soviet territory so quickly. When tanks first appeared on
the battlefields of World War 1, the British used them to break the stalemate of trench
warfare.7 Thinly-armored, slow, and bristling with cannons and machine guns, early
tanks were essentially mobile pillboxes containing several different fighting positions that
would slowly roll through enemy trenches, supported closely by infantry.8 After WW1
however, tanks became faster, better-armored, and most importantly, now utilized the
common design familiar today, with a revolving turret carrying the main armament.
Tanks were now more heavily armed, but less suited for dealing with infantry directly as
their predecessors covered in machine gun emplacements. Many countries relegated
tanks to a support role, to be used as more of a mobile artillery piece than a dedicated
anti-infantry platform. The American M4 for example, was originally designed to be used
in strikes against enemy rear areas with dedicated tank destroyers and towed anti-tank
guns to be used as the primary anti-tank force.9
German military philosophy changed these old ideas of tank warfare dramatically.
Coupled with supporting mechanized infantry, German tanks and tank destroyers were to
act in massed formations as an armored spearhead, and thus the panzer division was born.
A panzer division revolved around a combined-arms approach to ground warfare,
coupling tanks with assault guns, mechanized infantry, artillery support, and anti-aircraft

7

(Littledale 1918) 1, Part IV
(Littledale 1918) 1, Part IV
9
(Ulio 1942) 66
8

12

batteries into a single military unit.10 Rather than having tanks spread throughout infantry
units or grouped in small platoons, a panzer division would generally contain
concentrated units of armored fighting vehicles and other support units. A typical panzer
division circa June 1941 was roughly comprised of 100-200 tanks, an assortment of tank
destroyers, towed anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft batteries, though these numbers varied
widely during the war. Two battalions of mechanized infantry, and up to 200 trucks were
also integrated into these units to support the tanks and occupy areas as the division
advanced.11 When engaging enemy positions, the tanks would quickly advance in massed
formations and overwhelm the opposing forces through sheer force, followed by
mechanized infantry and support vehicles. These logistics units would quickly establish
an occupying force to ensure the area was pacified and leave sufficient troops to establish
supply lines before pushing further into enemy territory. This method of quickly
capturing an area, setting up supply lines, and pushing on enabled the Germans to capture
territory at unprecedented rates and formed the core of the blitzkrieg strategy.
The crux of what became known at the blitzkrieg strategy was the addition of new
technologies, such as tanks, mechanized infantry, and attack aircraft, to supplement prior
German military thought regarding traditional Bewegungskrieg, or maneuver warfare.12
This system developed from Prussian military tactics used during the Franco-Prussian
War and involved utilizing superior numbers, speed, and intelligence to bypass and
surround enemy strongpoints in a Kesselschlacht, or cauldron battle, and destroy enemy
forces before they could react. The pairing of these traditional German tactics with
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mechanized forces and aircraft working in close coordination formed what Western
forces labeled as blitzkrieg, though the German military eschewed this term except in use
in propaganda. Adolf Hitler himself explicitly derided the term in 1941, calling the term
“idiotic”.13 As such, blitzkrieg can be best described as an evolutionary step in German
military doctrine, having stemmed from traditional tactics, rather than a revolutionary
step that upended all prior doctrine. Nevertheless, it proved to be a highly effective
strategy that devastated Soviet forces at the outset of the invasion and proved Nazi
Germany to be an existential threat to the citizens of the USSR.
As the summer of 1941 approached, the Wehrmacht began preparations for the
assault on Eastern Europe. In the buildup to the invasion, the Luftwaffe flew dozens of
reconnaissance flights, mapping out invasion routes, important infrastructure, and the
positions of various Red Army divisions.14 Meanwhile on the ground, dozens of divisions
of troops were moved into position in various staging areas along what was soon to
become the largest military front in history, albeit disguised as signaling troops and
drilling units.15 Only on the eve of the invasion would the necessary vehicles be shipped
by train to the staging areas to arm the three massive army groups massing on the Soviet
border, Army Groups North, Center, and South. Once the armor arrived and all
preparations were complete, on June 22, 1941, the invasion began, and 3.8 million Axis
troops swarmed over the Soviet border, kickstarting one the largest military actions in
history. 16
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German Tank Development:
Nazi Germany utilized a great diversity of armored vehicle designs during the
war. Various vehicles were used for different purposes, traditional light, medium, and
heavy tanks comprised the bulk of the panzer divisions and were used to both support
friendly infantry as well as combat enemy armor. Other vehicles like tank destroyers and
assault guns were more specialized, utilizing howitzers or anti-tank guns in casematestyle designs to serve more specialized purposes, or as a cheaper alternative to traditional
turreted tanks. Due to the arms race on this front to build more effective vehicles,
significant changes in German armor design can be seen throughout the course of the
war. At the outset of the conflict the bulk of Germany’s armored forces were comprised
of lighter vehicles such Panzer 38’s, Panzer III’s and Panzer IV’s. as well as
Sturmgeschutz assault guns. However, as the war progressed, these vehicles were
supplemented with much heavier vehicles such as the Tiger 1 and Tiger 2 heavy tanks,
the Panther medium tank, and the Jagdpanther and Ferdinand tank destroyers. These later
vehicles boasted much thicker armor than their early-war counterparts, as well as larger
guns and increased complexity, reflecting the need for better armed and armored vehicles
to contend with the huge numbers of medium tanks and other vehicles being fielded by
the USSR.
One of the most common types of vehicles from this period were light tanks and
tankettes. Light tanks are smaller, lightly-armored vehicles that generally mount a lowercaliber gun (rifle-caliber to 45mm) and are used primarily for reconnaissance and infantry
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support.17 Light tanks saw common use on the Eastern front at the beginning of the war
but were gradually phased out in favor of heavier vehicles. Tank usage during this time
generally revolved around the concept of infantry support or acting as a mobile artillery
platform, rather than as a dedicated anti-armor fighting vehicle as would frequently
become the case as the war dragged on. Vehicles in this category from the period include
the German Pz. 38t, Panzer I, and Panzer II. By the time of World War 2, light tanks
were the predominant armored vehicles fielded by countries across the world. A few
exceptions to this rule were the French Char 1B and the Soviet KV heavy tanks, and
Soviet T-34 medium tanks. Given the disastrous results of initial German light and
medium tank encounters with their heavier Soviet adversaries, it became clear that these
light vehicles had become antiquated in engagements with enemy armor and that the
Wehrmacht needed more substantial vehicles to deal with the unexpected threat posed by
Soviet tanks.
Alongside various models of light tanks, Nazi Germany also made extensive use
of medium tanks during their initial push into the USSR. Medium tanks represent a
compromise in tank design between the heavier armor of heavy tanks and the greater
speed of light tanks. Medium tanks filled a jack-of-all-trades role, serving in both
dedicated anti-armor and infantry support roles, several German examples include Pz. III,
Pz. IV, and Panther tanks. It is also worth noting that the designation “medium” tank
refers to a given vehicle’s role rather than strictly its physical size or weight, as the
aforementioned Panther was considered a medium tank by German forces but far
outweighed most medium tanks used by the Allied forces. Due to their compromise

16

between decent armor, armament, and increased speed over heavy tanks, medium tanks
were generally the deciding force in armor engagements and one of the most numerous
types of tank produced during the Second World War
Throughout the Second World War and on the Eastern Front in particular, various
forays were made into large armored vehicles capable of mounting larger weapons than
medium vehicles as well as additional armor protection; these were known as heavy
tanks. Heavy tanks often represented the pinnacle of a country’s armor development,
boasting powerful guns and thick armor at the cost of speed. The primary duty of a heavy
tank was engaging enemy armored vehicles using a high-caliber main gun. As the war
dragged on, requirements in armor thickness and gun caliber for heavy tanks rose
dramatically, as Germany and the Soviet Union raced to establish armored superiority on
the battlefields of East Europe. This led to a variety of designs and armor schemes, with
the Soviets and Germans developing distinct design philosophies to establish armored
superiority. German heavy tanks used during World War 2 include the Tiger I and Tiger
II.
Alongside traditional turreted tanks, tank destroyers were another type of armored
vehicle that saw extensive use and development during the war. Tank destroyers, as the
name suggests, are dedicated anti-armor vehicles designed around a powerful main gun,
albeit generally without a turret.18 These turret-less tanks utilized a casemate design
instead, essentially an armored box mounted on tracks, carrying a front-mounted gun
with a limited angle of fire. Despite the obvious loss in gun-mobility with a casemate
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design over a turreted configuration, there were several advantages to this configuration.
Due to having greater interior space available as a result of the common casemate design,
tank destroyers were often able to mount a more powerful gun than their turreted
counterparts. The benefits of these designs extended to the manufacturing process and
tank destroyers were generally much cheaper to produce than traditional tanks, leading to
significant production of these types of vehicles within both Nazi Germany and the
USSR.19
Out of all the designs discussed, tank destroyers arguably vary the most in design,
even within a single country’s military. Many different types exist from World War 2,
with varying designs from small, lightly-armored vehicles built on the chassis of light
tanks like the Marder series of tank destroyers, to armored behemoths such as the
Jagdtiger, built on the chassis of the Tiger II heavy tank20. Soviet designers took a
different approach. While traditional tank destroyers such as the SU-76 and SU-100 saw
service throughout the war, some of the most reliable tank destroyers fielded by the Red
Army were in fact, self-propelled guns, artillery pieces designed for indirect fire as well
as infantry support and mounted on tracks for mobility. These tank destroyers, namely
the SU-152 and ISU-152, knocked out enemy tanks with massive non-penetrating high
explosive shells, rather than high-velocity armor-piercing rounds more commonly used
on anti-tank vehicles. Tank destroyers also varied widely in usage, with standard doctrine
being to use ambush tactics to destroy enemy armor. Other designs however were used in
a more offensive role. This subcategory of vehicles, known as assault guns, share many
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features with dedicated tank destroyers but are intended to be used as infantry support
vehicles, using their guns to assist infantry pushes and destroy enemy strongpoints.21
Notable German examples include the Sturmgeschutz III, commonly known as the Stug
III, as well as the Sturmtiger. Sturmtiger was a short-barreled tank destroyer that used a
massive rocket-propelled projectile rather than a true tank shell to support infantry in
confined urban areas, where a longer-barreled vehicle would have suffered difficulty
moving.22
With such a variety in tank destroyer designs, particularly among the German
forces, it might be asked why so many vehicles of this type were developed. Generally, as
tanks were developed in Nazi Germany, a corresponding casemate-style tank destroyer
would be developed shortly after using the same chassis to save on production costs23.
Due to the lack of a turret, these vehicles were generally cheaper to produce than their
turreted counterparts and expanded Germany’s options for dealing with enemy vehicles.
Additionally, tank destroyers excelled in ambush scenarios, making them highly suitable
for the defensive situation Nazi Germany found themselves in as their offensives in the
east ground to a halt and the Red Army subsequently pushed them back to Berlin. Given
the situation, it is not surprising that a variety of tank destroyer designs went into
production, given the wide variety of tanks used by Nazi Germany over the course of the
war. Hence, the lighter Marder and Hetzer lines of tank destroyers were developed from
the chassis of the Panzer 38 light tank, while the Stug III was developed from the Panzer
III medium tank, the heavier Jagdpanther was developed from the Panther medium tank,

21
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and the mammoth Elefant and Jagdtiger tank destroyers were developed from the chassis
of the Porsche Tiger and Tiger II respectively.
Now that an overview of armored vehicle types has been made, it is time to take a
closer look at some specific vehicles fielded by the Wehrmacht as the war went on to
better illustrate the roles that these vehicles played during the invasion. As the following
will illustrate, demands for armored vehicles changed greatly as the war progressed, and
pre-war designs quickly became obsolete as combat on the Eastern Front intensified. As
Axis forces realized that their tanks were inadequate for dealing with newer Soviet
designs, old tanks were removed from service entirely or retrofitted with additional armor
and guns to keep them competitive on the battlefield.24 Similarly, Soviet forces
recognized both the threat posed by the invading forces and also that while their current
light tanks were inadequate, some of their more recent designs were competent vehicles
that could be refined and mass-produced to counter the threat posed by the Axis. The
Wehrmacht in turn fielded ever-heavier vehicles to counter new designs that the Soviet
Union introduced, leading to the development of massive vehicles like the Tiger 2 heavy
tank in the later stages of the war. Though not a comprehensive list by any means, the
vehicles included here were generally widely produced, highly effective in their designed
roles, or otherwise significant to the war effort, leading the Nazi charge to annihilate the
peoples of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the following vehicles will be discussed in
greater detail: The Hetzer tank destroyer, Panzer III medium tank, Stug III assault gun,
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the Panzer IV medium tank, the Panther medium tank, the Jagdpanther tank destroyer, the
Tiger heavy tank, the Elefant Tank destroyer, and the Tiger II heavy tank.
The Hetzer, officially known as the Jagdpanzer 38t, was a tank destroyer
developed from the chassis of the Panzer 38(t) light tank. 25 Though the Panzer 38 was an
effective light tank in the early days of the war during Germany’s operations in Poland, it
quickly proved to be inadequate in terms of armor and armament to face down the much
heavier Soviet T-34 and KV.26 As such, production was halted, and these light tanks had
their chassis lengthened, turrets removed, and additional sloped armor added to form the
Hetzer. The new tank destroyer was compact and easily hidden, carried a reliable 75mm
main gun, was well-armored, with a frontal plate 60mm thick and sloped backwards at 60
degrees, giving approximately 120mm of effective armor.27 Perhaps most importantly,
the Hetzer was cheap to produce. Entering service in 1944, over 1,577 units were
produced, forming an important supplement to the Wehrmacht’s tank destroyer arm.
Though light tanks played an important role in the opening stages of the second
world war, their light armament and thin armor led to them being largely supplanted in
importance by various medium tanks by the time of Operation Barbarossa. The
Panzerkampfwagen III was a medium tank that initially formed the backbone of the Nazi
Panzer Corps during the early stages of the war. 2829 These vehicles were widely-used,
seeing action in all major theatres; from western Russia in the east, to the North African
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deserts, to western Europe where they saw action during the D-Day operations.30 During
Operation Barbarossa, these tanks, equipped with 37 and 50-millimeter main guns, were
more than a match for the older and more numerous T-26 and BT-7 light tanks fielded in
large numbers by the Red Army. However, Pz. III crews were horrified to learn upon
entering combat that their vehicles were unable to penetrate the newer T-34 and KV, at
the time the most advanced tank designs in use by any nation. 31 As a result, the Panzer
III was up-armored, but its turret ring was too small to allow for significant upgrades to
its armament, so it was relegated to infantry support roles in favor of the newer Panzer IV
medium tank and heavier vehicles for tank combat.32 However, the chassis proved useful
in developing the Stug III, which would be one of the most effective tank destroyers to be
fielded by Germany during the war33.
The Sturmgeschutz III, commonly known as the Stug III, would become one of
the most prolific and effective German tank destroyers of the second World War. 34 Built
on the chassis of the aging Pz. III medium tank, the Stug III were originally designed to
be an assault gun and used for infantry support.35 The design proved to be an excellent
tank destroyer as well. Old requirements for the vehicle to be no taller than an average
soldier made the Stug III compact and therefore easy to hide and a difficult target for
Allied gunners. Mounting a variety of guns and gradually up-armored as the war
progressed, more sophisticated variants were introduced. The Stug was generally capable
of penetrating all but the most heavily-armored tanks used by Allied forces. Due to its
30
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effectiveness in its newfound role, over 11,000 units were constructed and used by Nazi
Germany and its allied nations.36
Though the Panzer III served the Axis well in the west, it was inadequate for
dealing with heavier Soviet armor found on the Eastern Front. As a result, it was largely
supplanted by the Panzerkampfwagen IV, commonly known as the Pz. IV or Panzer IV.37
The Panzer IV was a German medium tank that formed the backbone of the Wehrmacht’s
armored fighting vehicles during World War 2 alongside the Panzer III. With over 15,000
units of the Pz. IV and its tank destroyer variants produced, it also carries the distinction
of being the only German tank to remain in continuous production throughout the war.38
It proved to be a more versatile platform than its younger “sibling”, the Panzer III, by
virtue of its larger turret ring and thicker armor allowing for much greater
upgradeability.39 After initial encounters with the comparatively well-armored T-34 and
KV, the Panzer IV was quickly upgraded with a more powerful gun for anti-tank use, as
well as additional applique armor and spaced armor for defense.40 The Panzer IV was
certainly not the only tank to use spaced armor, extra armor plates added a set distance
from a tank’s normal armor to shatter and reduce the energy of incoming projectiles, but
it was a ubiquitous vehicle and thus a prime example of this particular armor technique.
In addition to serving throughout the war as a versatile medium tank, the Panzer IV was
also the basis of a number of other armored gun platforms including the Jagdpanzer IV,
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Brummbar, and Stug IV tank destroyers, but as combat intensified on the Eastern Front,
German High Command elected to produce ever-heavier and better-armed vehicles.41
Panzerkampfwagen V Panther known colloquially as the Mark V or simply
Panther, was a heavy medium tank that arguably represented the pinnacle of German
medium tank development.4243 Armed with a more powerful gun and much heavier and
more efficient armor than its predecessors Panzer III and Panzer IV, the Panther
represented a hybrid design between medium and heavy tank ideologies.44 While
retaining the powerful engine mounted to the much heavier Tiger I, the Panther was a
lighter vehicle and thus more mobile, as well as much cheaper to produce than Tiger I,
while proving almost as effective on the battlefield. Built directly as a response to the T34 medium tank being fielded by the Soviet Union, the Panther equipped a long-barreled
75 mm main gun capable of penetrating Soviet armor at great distances.45 As a result, the
Panther excelled in long-range engagements on open ground, but was not as effective as
an infantry support vehicle due to its weak high explosive shell, which was less-suitable
for use against targets such as pillboxes. Additionally, the Panther utilized a sloped armor
layout similar to the Soviet T-34 and KV tanks. Besides possessing greater armor
thickness by default, the heavily sloped front plates gave the Panther even more effective
armor and thus excellent frontal protection, though its side armor was weaker and not
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angled.46 This stood in sharp contrast to earlier German designs, which had relied on
thicker armor rather than angling for protection.
Despite these advances, the Panther also suffered from numerous reliability issues
and other problems that hindered its performance in the East. The early Panther engines
suffered from sealing and ventilation issues, leading to frequent fires, and the
overcomplicated suspension of interlocked roadwheels made repairs difficult and timeconsuming.47 In addition to battle damage, the bi-annual rasputitsa, or mud seasons, of
western Russia and Ukraine wreaked havoc on the Panther and other German
vehicles.4849 Mud would become wedged into the suspensions of vehicles such as the
Panther and freeze overnight, forcing crews to spend hours chipping away the dirty ice
with tools or a blowtorch to permit vehicle movement. Additionally, as the war dragged
on, German supply shortages led to compromises in the metallurgy of tank armor.50 The
Panther in particular suffered from this as different alloys began to be used to
manufacture its armor. Towards the end of the war it suffered from its armor cracking
into pieces upon being struck by Soviet guns, instead of deforming or blocking the shells.
In short, though the Panther was an excellent tank on paper, with thick armor and a
powerful gun, its reliability issues, general overengineering, and its poor ability to
support infantry, caused its performance to suffer from its inception.

46

(Forczyk, Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller 2016) Location 5275
(Bishop 2002) 15
48
Appendix H
49
(Forczyk, Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt 2014) Location 374
50
(Forczyk, Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller 2016) Location 4618
47

25

The Jagdpanther was another example of the heavier armored vehicles being
fielded by Nazi Germany post-1942. 51 Introduced in 1944, the Jagdpanther was a heavy
tank destroyer built to carry the highly effective 88mm KwK 43 anti-tank gun, and over
400 units were produced during the war.52 This gun was used by a variety of vehicles in
the later stages of World War 2, but German officials struggled to come up with a
suitable tank destroyer to wield this weapon up until later stages of the war. The earlier
Nashorn was an effective tank destroyer with this weapon mounted, but proved too
lightly armored and was knocked out by enemy vehicles and infantry with ease.53 The
Ferdinand however, mounted the same gun, and had excellent armor protection, but was
slow, mechanically unreliable, and still highly vulnerable to infantry. The Jagdpanther
provided a middle-of-the-road option, using highly sloped armor in an evolution of
German armor doctrine started by its predecessor the Panther, but kept its weight down
despite offering protection similar to the much heavier Ferdinand.54 Due to the reduced
weight, the Jagdpanther retained some of the mobility of its predecessor, or at least more
so than many heavier tanks it served alongside. Despite its powerful armament and good
protection, Jagdpanther suffered the most from the stage of the war at which it was
introduced. Serving on the Eastern Front only from January of 1945 onwards, German
wartime production could no longer keep up with the needs of its armed forces, and so
Jagdpanther suffered from crippling supply shortages, fuel and replacement parts were
simply not available.55 As such, many of the Jagdpanthers taken out of action on the
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Eastern Front were in fact often destroyed by their own crews to prevent them from
falling into enemy hands.
Though Panther and Jagdpanther proved to be effective, or at least as effective as
could be expected given Germany’s wartime situation, they were certainly not the first of
this new class of heavier vehicles fielded by the Panzerwaffe, Nazi Germany’s armored
corps. That title goes to Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger, commonly known as Tiger I.56 The
Tiger I was the first armored vehicle fielded by the Wehrmacht to use the aforementioned
88mm KwK anti-tank gun, and it proved to be a devastatingly effective weapon.
Developed from an 88mm anti-aircraft gun, the 88mm KwK was Germany’s response to
the threat of the Soviet T-34 and KV in the opening stages of Operation Barbarossa, as
the vast majority of German tanks used in this offensive could not penetrate these
vehicles except at point-blank range.57 Initially a towed anti-tank gun, it was later
mounted to the Tiger I after it became apparent to German High Command that current
tanks were not adequately armed.58 As such, the Panzerwaffe quickly began upgrading
existing Panzer IV’s with spaced armor and high-velocity 75mm anti-tank guns, and a
slew of new vehicles were fast-tracked for development or increased production.59 With
its large main gun and thick armor, Tiger I was destined to become Germany’s first true
heavy tank that was not a captured vehicle produced by another country, such as the
French Char B1.60 Tiger I entered service in 1942 and quickly established a reputation for
itself with its deadly 88mm main gun. Despite not being produced in as large of number
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as Stug III or the Panzer III and IV, with just shy of 1400 units being produced
throughout the war, Tiger 1 had a formidable reputation on the battlefield and was widely
feared by Soviet and other Allied commanders. 61 In fact, reports of engagements with
Tigers by American armored divisions appear to have been inflated rather dramatically,
as the tank had such a fearsome reputation and shared some visual similarities with its
“colleagues” Pz. IV and Panther, that crews often identified German vehicles that
knocked out American tanks as Tigers due to the reputation of its powerful main gun.62
Despite the powerful gun however, Tiger I still represented a transitional stage in German
armor design. Though the Tiger borrowed some design elements, such as the wider
tracks, from the Soviet T-34. It did not inherit the sloped armor as the later Panther and
other designs did and instead relied on rote armor thickness for protection. Tiger 1 had up
to 100mm of armor at the front to around 80mm on most upper portions of the tank, with
little rounding or angling apart from the turret.63 Instead, Tiger crews were instructed to
angle the tank themselves against enemy vehicles to maximize their effective armor. This
tactic proved effective because of the Tiger’s box-like shape but was ultimately
guesswork at best on the part of the crew. This tactic was largely unnecessary with
heavier later vehicles and made little difference for lightly-armored vehicles like the
Panzer III or IV against any but the lowest-caliber guns. Though produced in limited
numbers and suffering from similar reliability issues, “teething” early in its development,
by the later stages of the war Tiger 1’s reliability had increased significantly and easily
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earned its reputation as an effective armored vehicle, arguably cementing its place in the
minds of many as the definitive World War 2 German tank.
Though the Tiger 1 has certainly cemented its place in the mythos of the Second
World War, it is not as commonly known that there were actually two competing designs
for what would become the Tiger tank. While the Henschel-built design was ultimately
adopted for production, Ferdinand Porsche submitted a competing design with similar
specifications. Ultimately, his design failed, and once the Henschel design was selected
however, these 90 hulls were instead rebuilt as a heavy tank destroyer, mounting the new
88mm Panzerjagerkanone 43/2, a powerful anti-tank gun that was also mounted to the
Nashorn and the later Jagdpanther tank destroyers.64 This new tank destroyer, known as
Ferdinand after initial production and Elefant after a round of modifications, was capable
of destroying Soviet armor before Red army tankers were within effective firing range
themselves. 65 Additionally, Ferdinand was heavily armored, but like the Tiger design
upon which it was based, used little angling to increase its protection. Its gun proved
extremely effective, being able to knock out T-34’s at ranges of over 3 kilometers, with a
maximum firing range of over 9 miles. Additionally, the high velocity of its shell gave it
even more killing power than the weapons of the Tiger 1 and Panther, being able to also
easily penetrate heavier Soviet tanks such as the IS tank family and the tank destroyers
based on the IS chassis. However, the vehicle’s many downsides were showcased at the
titanic Battle of Kursk, one of the largest armored engagements in history. While nearly
all units of the Ferdinand were deployed here and proved effective at long range, the
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vehicles shortcomings rapidly became apparent. Despite its thick armor, the vehicle had
poor crew visibility and no way to defend itself against infantry, and as such when
Ferdinands advanced through Soviet lines they could be easily swarmed and knocked out
by infantry with grenades and anti-vehicle charges.66 After Kursk, the surviving
Ferdinands were re-fitted with anti-infantry machine guns, additional viewing ports, and
anti-mine Zimmerit putty and re-designated Elefant.67 Hereafter they continued to serve
in the East, as well as in Italy, though frequent breakdowns hindered their operational
capabilities for the remainder of the war. Overall, the vehicle was superseded in
functionality by the later Jagdpanther, but despite its many flaws it was statistically one
of the most effective tank destroyers of the Second World War, with an average kill ratio
of ten enemy vehicles per Elefant lost.68 Ultimately, the Ferdinand was produced in too
few numbers to have a major outcome on the war in the east, but the performance of its
gun was a sign to German engineers that other vehicles could use this and similar-caliber
weapons to great effect, and this can be seen in the later Jagdpanther tank destroyer and
Tiger II heavy tank.
The Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf B., or Tiger II represented the pinnacle of
German heavy tank development during World War 2.6970 Mounting the new 88mm PaK
43 main gun shared by the Ferdinand, Nashorn, and Jagdpanther, it proved a deadly
opponent on the battlefield, being able to knock out all Allied vehicles from ranges in
excess of 2 km.71 Additionally, the Tiger II improved on its predecessor Tiger 1 by
66

(Bishop 2002) 47
(Bishop 2002) 47
68
(B., Panzerjäger Tiger (P) Ferdinand 2015) 1
69
Appendix L
70
(Ogorkiewicz 2016) 1
71
(Bishop 2002) 16
67

30

integrating armor angling similar to that of the Panther. This increased efficiency in
addition to rote thickness made the Tiger II one of the most heavily-armored vehicles of
the war. Deployed in 1944 with around 492 units produced during the war, Tiger II was
used to augment heavy tank battalions. It was intended to replace the Tiger 1 entirely but
by this stage of the war Allied bombing had largely crippled Germany’s ability to
produce tanks in significant numbers.72 Additionally, the Tiger II was plagued by similar
problems that effected other heavily-armored vehicles during this time. Its gas mileage
was extremely poor, and thus the vehicle was expensive to run at a time when Germany
was desperately in need of fuel.73 Additionally, it was very slow, being powered by the
same engine as the Tiger and was subject to frequent overheating. Similarly, to the
Panther, compromises were made in the metallurgical composition of the armor, resulting
in cracks upon shell impact and severe spalling that could destroy internal components
and kill or severely injure crewmembers.74 Spalling is a state in which an armor plate
receives a non-penetrating impact that causes shards to fly off the opposite surface,
causing similar destruction as an outright shell penetration. With the more brittle armor
being fitted to these vehicles in the final stages of the war, hits from the massive 122mm
and 152mm shells of late-war Soviet heavy tanks and tank destroyers frequently proved
deadly.75 In short, though the Tiger II represented the pinnacle of German armor design
and mounted a highly effective main gun, it was ultimately hampered by its weak engine,
frequent breakdowns, and compromises made to its armor construction that relegated
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other advancements like its improved thickness and angling moot in engagements against
vehicles mounting large-caliber guns.
To summarize, Germany’s invasion of the USSR was driven by a desire to
violently expand the Reich into the Soviet Union and kill or enslave millions of people,
as the Slavs and Jews of the region were considered subhuman, untermenschen, and did
not fit into the Nazis’ idealized Aryan-led social order. As the Germans invaded, they
killed millions of people via the Einsatzgruppen death squads and later concentration
camps, as well as through intentional mass starvations. Moreover, the Wehrmacht was
able to accomplish this feat through their use of panzer divisions and mechanized infantry
to conquer huge swaths of Soviet territory with terrifying speed. German armored vehicle
construction changed considerably in the crucible of armored warfare on the Eastern
Front. While lighter vehicles proved sufficient to enact the blitzkrieg strategy for the
invasion of Poland, German vehicles such as the Panzer 38t and Panzer III were not
sufficient to deal with the threat posed by heavier Soviet armor. As the war progressed,
the Panzer III and in particular the Panzer IV were upgraded with spaced armor and
improved anti-tank guns, forming the backbone of the German armored forces.
Additionally, resources were poured into developing heavier vehicles such as Tiger 1
mounting various 88mm anti-tank guns, and assault guns such as Stug III were pressed
into service as tank destroyers, proving effective due to their low profile and comparative
ease of production. In the later stages of the war, the 88mm PaK 43 anti-tank gun was
fitted to a number of vehicles, including Tiger II, Ferdinand, Jagdpanther, and Nashorn,
and proved to be an effective and reliable anti-tank gun, remaining in production through
the end of the war. Concurrently, German tank construction changed, incorporating traits
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such as sloped armor to improve armor efficiency, and wider tracks to negotiate the
terrain of the Eastern Front. Despite these improvements however, compromises in armor
construction rendered some of these advancements moot, while critical fuel shortages and
the lack of replacement parts led to many German vehicles being lost due to otherwise
simple maintenance issues, stacking the odds against an already badly-outnumbered
Wehrmacht. Meanwhile, Soviet production capabilities and tank development of their
own in concert with massive offensives and bad weather eventually led to the total
German defeat in this theatre.
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Part 2: The Soviet Response
As millions of Axis troops rushed across the border between the Soviet Union and
the Third Reich, the Red Army were caught almost completely by surprise. Not
anticipating an invasion for months or years and with the Red Army largely demobilized
in the west, Stalin rushed to shore up the defenses of the USSR before Germany achieved
total victory. Although the Soviet Union possessed millions of troops and tens of
thousands of tanks at the outset of the German invasion, most of these resources were
badly out of position and lacked critical supplies and leadership due to Stalin’s purges in
previous years.76 As a result, Axis forces were able to push rapidly into Soviet territory,
capturing or laying siege to large cities such as Stalingrad, Leningrad, and reaching the
outskirts of Moscow within 6 months of the start of the invasion. In order to halt their
advance, desperate measures would have to be taken by the Soviet Union, mobilizing
their population towards the war effort and producing thousands of their own armored
vehicles to answer the armored fist of the Axis and preserve the Soviet peoples from
extermination.
To better illustrate the dire situation the peoples of the USSR found themselves in
when the Nazis invaded, this section will focus primarily on the Soviet response to the
initial invasion and the methods by which they were able to turn the tide of battle. This is
to illustrate the overarching point that the Soviet Union needed to make massive changes
to the way they conducted armored warfare to halt the German advance and campaign of
extermination. The Red Army was in a state of demobilization and disarray at the outset
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of the fighting, with mechanized corps in particular suffering from a lack of leadership,
supplies, and training. This neglect of the armored forces led to the Soviet inability to put
up meaningful resistance to the invasion and entire Red Army divisions were captured by
the better-organized Germans and subsequently killed, being outmaneuvered at the
strategic level by German mechanized divisions. Later in the conflict, these deficiencies
would be remedied through greater tactical coordination and the distribution of
communications equipment to all tank crews. Additionally, the evacuation of Soviet
industry will be discussed, as the preservation of armaments factories in the fact of the
German advance was critical to the war effort. Finally, an overview of combat on the
front and several major offensives that featured the use of armor divisions will be
discussed to provide a better framework in which to discuss tank development.
Given the speed and distances at which the front moved throughout the war in the
east, it is clear that mechanized warfare must have played a vital role in the outcome of
combat in the theater. While the Eastern Front may appear to form a uniform front
stretching north to south across eastern Europe and Russia, a closer look reveals that
strategic encirclements and other complex maneuvers played an important role in combat
in this theater. As a result, for the duration of the fighting the structure of the front
resembled a shape closer to that of a jigsaw puzzle, with large bulges of held territory
from both sides protruding into the holdings of the other.77 This type of formation is
known as a salient and became a defining characteristic of the warfare on this front.
Salients were vulnerable to being pinched off from their supply lines, forming a pocket. If
the troops caught in a pocket were unable to break out, they would eventually run out of
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supplies and be forced to surrender, removing them from the battle. This was a key
element of the German’s strategy on the Eastern Front, entire Soviet armies would be
encircled and captured, hundreds of thousands of men at a time, and they would all be put
to work or starved to death in prison camps as part of Nazi Germany’s Hunger Plan.
Pockets on the eastern front could range in size from just a few miles to dozens. Indeed,
the Kursk salient was over 150 miles wide at the time the Wehrmacht launched Operation
Citadel to retake it.78 The salients and encirclements of the Eastern Front would be one of
the prime reasons the Soviets lost millions of men to capture and defeat early in the war.
These huge losses caused entire divisions to vanish completely to Nazi hands and
required drastically increased recruitment of men and vehicle production to replenish the
losses.
While encirclements have been a staple tactic in warfare throughout history, the
sheer scale of the salients and pockets present on the front, containing several hundred
square miles and hundreds of thousands of men clearly sets them apart in scope from
other engagements throughout history. The scale of such formations illustrates the fact
that these huge regions could only have been encircled with the mobility provided by
tanks and infantry, and this proved to be the case in numerous engagements on the
Eastern Front. In the early stages of the war, the rapid Axis advance led to the capture of
millions of Soviet troops, often hundreds of thousands at a time. This was in large part
due to the utilization of blitzkrieg maneuvers, where German panzer divisions and
mechanized infantry would quickly sweep through an area, while regular infantry would
be used to hold the new territory as the armored units pushed on. Specific examples of
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this tactic in action include the Battle of Białystok–Minsk, where over 450,000 Soviet
troops were surrounded, to the first Battle of Kiev, where a similar number of troops were
encircled and subsequently captured and an additional 200,000 were killed in the fighting
up to that point. 7980 Similarly, the Red Army made use of massive encirclements in
offensives like Operation Uranus, which sealed the fate of the German 6th Army at
Stalingrad in 1942, and once more during Operation Bagration where the Red Army
crushed Germany’s Army Group Center in 1944, capturing over 500,000 Wehrmacht
troops.81
Conversely, a properly-defended salient could also prove to be a boon to the
forces holding it. During the interwar period, Soviet tacticians developed a military
philosophy known as “Deep Battle”.82 This philosophy emphasized the importance of not
simply destroying an enemy at the main battle line, the front, but also to work the entire
depth of an enemy’s formation and supply lines and destroy the enemy’s logistics
quickly. Once multiple breakthroughs in an enemy’s lines were achieved, a large force of
fresh troops would wreak havoc in the enemy’s lightly-defended rear areas.83 Hence,
during the Second World War, a well-defended salient was often used by the Red Army
as a staging ground to launch sweeping offensives through the German lines and run
amok in their supply areas, quickly taking back large swaths of territory. The speed and
violence necessary for such a breakthrough to be made achieved fit the role of the Red
Army’s unique tank designs handily and was the driving factor behind the massive
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production of these vehicles that Soviet leadership demanded. Generally focusing on
higher speed and thinner armor set at angles as opposed to their German counterparts,
Red Army tanks would prove instrumental in achieving the USSR’s victories against
Hitler’s Reich in the latter stages of World War 2.
Though the Soviet Deep Battle strategy proved extremely effective in the latter
stages of the war, the abandonment of this strategy before Operation Barbarossa
commenced coupled with the recent purges of the Red Army’s officer corps by Stalin, led
to severely impaired martial ability on the eve of the German invasion.84 Soviet High
Command, the Stavka, had to gradually re-learn and implement this strategy on a theater
level as Deep Battle proponents had largely been purged by Stalin in prior years.85
Coupled with the fact that the German invasion took the USSR completely by surprise,
this mistake cost the Red Army dearly in the first years of the war. In addition to having
to re-learn their principle battle strategy, critical supply shortages of vehicles, including
tanks, components, ammunition, radios, and other war material led to the Red Army
being all but shattered during the first six months of combat on the Eastern Front.
As the Wehrmacht poured into the USSR, Soviet troops were slow to react. Not
anticipating an invasion for months or years, the Red Army was quickly pushed back
despite a notable numerical advantage of 5.7 million troops and 25,000 tanks to the
invading German force of 3.8 million men and 3,300-3,800 tanks.86 This advantage was
somewhat muted by the state of demobilization of the Red Army forces at the
commencement of Operation Barbarossa, with only 2.8 million personnel and 11,000
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tanks positioned to blunt the invasion force, though these vehicles were antiquated and
poorly equipped for combat.87 Additionally, the Axis forces had made extensive
disinformation efforts in the months leading up to the campaign, with troop movements
carefully disguised. Soviet wire networks were also cut as the invasion began to sow
confusion and maintain the element of surprise. This compounded prior Soviet
communication issues, as radios were in desperate shortage at this time and Red Army
units already had difficulty communicating with one another. As Soviet troops began to
fall under attack, communications were muddled and incoherent. The MolotovRibbentrop act of Soviet-German non-aggression was still in effect and Soviet leadership
was not expecting hostile action of any kind, let alone an invasion of such unprecedented
scale. As communications from front-line troops under attack began to arrive, muddled
responses were sent back from the Soviet leadership: “You must be insane. And why is
your signal not in code?”.88
Soviet tank crews also suffered severe losses as the invasion swept through the
front lines. Though the new T-34 and KV-1 were present from the outset of hostilities on
the Eastern Front, the bulk of Soviet tanks present in Western Russia were T-26 and BTseries light tanks.89 While these vehicles were on par with vehicles from the WW1 and
interwar period in terms of armament and armor, they were thinly armored light tanks
built to support infantry units rather than fight modern German tanks. They also utilized
gasoline engines that were prone to catching fire, and thousands burned as the invasion
force swept through western Russia. Many tank crews attempted counter-attacks through
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the advancing German lines, but these were unilaterally cut off from their already limited
support and eliminated.
Conversely, T-34 crews and KV’s fared better against German anti-tank weapons,
to the point of near immunity. However, these vehicles were not present in great enough
numbers at the outset of hostilities to make a significant impact on the theater for several
years. Nevertheless, these new vehicles proved a nasty surprise for German tank crews,
who were horrified to find they could not penetrate these new Soviet vehicles as they had
so easily with the T-26’s and BT-series vehicles.90 Tanks such as Pz. 38, Pz III, and early
Pz. IV’s were almost completely unable to penetrate a T-34 save for point-blank shots
down into the top armor and engine deck. This fact spurred rapid German development of
heavier vehicles, for which the Soviets would have to answer with increased armored
development of their own. In the meantime, infantry with satchel charges and incendiary
grenades, or towed anti-tank guns, were used as stopgap solutions to the unexpected
Soviet resistance. A key limiting factor for the new T-34’s were the severe reliability
issues that many new tanks suffered from during this period. The T-34 suffered from
severe reliability issues with its engine and transmission, with early models becoming
completely unusable after only driving around 200km cross-country.91 These vehicles
were then subsequently destroyed by their crews to prevent their capture, further straining
Soviet tank-production to replace these losses. Additional reliability problems with the
early transmissions led to many T-34 crews driving into battle with an extra transmission
tied to the rear engine deck to replace the first when it inevitably gave out.92 Though
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these issues were gradually ironed out in later iterations of the vehicle, these problems
caused numerous non-combat losses that compounded the disastrous state of the front
already.
Several accounts from German forces that first encountered the T-34 attest to its
near-invulnerability in 1941. One such recollection states that a single T-34 broke
through the German lines and crushed a 37mm artillery piece, destroyed a pair of Panzer
II light tanks, and continued to engage German forces in an 8.7-mile-long path of
destruction before finally being destroyed by a howitzer at close range.93 Such accounts
are not unique and coincide with common Soviet policy for tanks to engage the enemy
for as long as they could once behind enemy lines. Though limited amounts of
destruction were achieved via these methods, overall the momentum of the front did not
change significantly until the Wehrmacht finally stopped their advance at the cities of
Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Rostov, encountering fiercely determined Red Army
resistance. Nevertheless, the efficacy of the T-34’s advanced design for the period was
proven and served as a harbinger of the huge quantities of this tank that would be
produced as the war progressed.
The KV was another tank that, while only present in limited numbers at the
outset of the fighting, presented significant difficulties for the rapidly-advancing German
forces. Nicknamed “Russischer Koloss”, or “Russian Colossus” by the Germans, this
large (6.25 meter) Soviet heavy tank presented an unforeseen problem for the attacking
Wehrmacht when fighting broke out.94 With armor protection roughly equivalent to the

93
94

(Carell 1966) 75
(Forczyk, Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt 2014) Location 1725

41

T-34, KV-1 and KV-2 were virtually immune to all standard anti-tank weapons fielded
by the Wehrmacht during Operation Barbarossa save for the 8.8cm Flak gun, which
became a staple for German heavy armor designs later in the war. One incident
illustrating the KV-1’s near-invulnerability comes from the account of a KV-series tank
penetrating far behind enemy lines, before being engaged by four 50mm towed anti-tank
guns from an anti-armor battalion. Suffering no penetrations, the KV returned fire,
destroying each gun in turn. A larger 88mm gun was moved into position behind the tank
but was destroyed by the KV before it could fire. Later that night infantry attacked with
satchel charges, but only succeeded in immobilizing the vehicle. Another 88mm gun was
moved into position, and achieved several penetrations, but the tank continued to fire
back. Finally, the KV ran out of ammunition for its main gun, and German infantry
advanced, only to be cut down by machine gun fire from its coaxial mount. The KV’s
crew were finally eliminated by several grenades thrown into the hatches by advancing
German infantry. 95
Another example of the KV’s legendary armor came from the account of the 6th
Panzer Division.96 The entire division, consisting mainly of Czech-built Pz. 35t light
tanks, was halted by a lone KV blocking the road. Engaging the lightly-armed Panzer IIs
and destroying several, the Soviet vehicle held up the German column for a full day.
Sustaining several penetrations by an 88mm gun, the crew finally perished when several
grenades were pushed through the holes the towed 88mm had made, as it had penetrated
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but failed to cripple the tank. The account states that the crew were buried by the
Germans with full military honors.97
Despite the failure of the early T-34’s and KV’s to significantly impact the
German advance, the advanced designs used in their construction were a harbinger of the
arms race between German and Soviet leadership to produce both more numerous and
better-quality tanks than the enemy going forward. It became clear after German
encounters with heavier Soviet vehicles that medium and heavy tanks with thicker armor
than their light tank predecessors would be the dominant force in armored warfare going
forward. Indeed, the surprise of encountering the T-34 and KV tank families directly led
to the development of vehicles such as the Tiger 1 and Panther, as well as even more
armed and armored vehicles that would come to define tank warfare during World War 2.
Despite these sporadic episodes of mass-destruction from individual tank crews,
overall the front faired very poorly for the Soviet Union. Viewed through the lens of
armored warfare, this can largely be attributed to the poor leadership and tactics of Soviet
tank crews, as well as the aforementioned “teething” issues related to the mechanical
reliability of new models and the general lack of radios installed on most Soviet tanks.98
The front continued to advance eastward at an alarming rate, and many Soviet
mechanized corps found themselves quickly cut off behind enemy lines. Enveloped by
the enemy, they adhered to their previous orders to cause as much destruction as possible,
before being neutralized by mechanical failure or enemy action. Additionally, with their
marching orders to continue attacking until disabled or destroyed, Soviet tanks frequently
found themselves operating alone with little to no infantry support. This left the tanks
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vulnerable to infantry attack and illustrates the failure of Soviet leadership to recognize
the importance of combined-arms tactics in warfare. The Wehrmacht did not make this
same mistake. Armed with more mechanically reliable vehicles at the outset of hostilities,
better gun optics, and perhaps most importantly, radios in nearly every vehicle, German
armor spearheaded the push to Moscow, crossing vast tracts of land in Western Russia
and Ukraine. Apart from sporadic encounters with Soviet mechanized corps comprised of
the new T-34’s and KV-1 and KV-2, German tanks shredded the older Soviet T-26’s and
BT’s with ease. As a result, Axis forces reached the outskirts of Moscow by November
1941, coming within sight of the Kremlin’s golden domes.99 100 However, the Germans
now lacked the strength to take Moscow, having diverted their forces elsewhere and
generally overextended themselves as winter set in. Indeed, by Winter of 1941 the
blitzkrieg in the north and central parts of Russia had stalled, with Axis forces halted at
Moscow and Leningrad and only Army Group South continuing to conquer territory
through 1942.101 The southern city of Kharkov changed hands several times, and the
German 6th Army became tied down for months at Stalingrad before being encircled and
forced to surrender by the Red Army on February 2nd, 1943.
Despite the initial surprise presented by Operation Barbarossa, Stalin had
anticipated an eventual German invasion for some time. As a result, plans to evacuate the
western regions of the USSR had been drawn up before the onset of hostilities with Nazi
Germany102. These initial preparations proved critical to the Soviet war effort, and several
important weapons and vehicle factories were preserved from Nazi conquest. In the years
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leading up to the outbreak of war, Soviet industry had gradually been shifted eastward,
along with many people living in the westernmost regions of the USSR. This was
certainly not done out of sympathy or concern for the people living in these regions, but
rather to establish total Party control and avoid “dissident” activities taking place once
the Germans attacked.103 For example, Volga Germans, part of the German Diaspora,
were deported en-masse to keep them as far-removed from the fighting as possible, as
well as Crimean Tatars, a Muslim religious minority who Party leadership felt would not
support the state when war broke out.104Once the invasion began, Soviet leadership began
to evacuate civilians eastward. Over the course of the war, an estimated 16 million
evacuees would be sent to the rear, to central and southern Russia, where they would be
press-ganged into work details on collective farms and re-established factories to
continue to support the war effort.105
As the fighting began, the Red Army developed a scorched-earth policy to deny
the Germans resources, even as they retreated across the Eurasian steppe towards their
own capital.106 This strategy proved effective, with the Red Army razing entire towns to
the ground, destroying food, and evacuating or sometimes massacring populations to
deny the oncoming Nazis access to anything that would help their war effort.107 Some of
the most effective facets of this strategy proved to be the deliberate destruction of Soviet
railways and the evacuation of entire factories eastwards. The destruction of Russian
railways and rail cars severely hampered the ability of the Germans to move troops,
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vehicles, and supplies easily once they entered the USSR.108 In addition to being built to
a different gauge than was used in the rest of Europe, the Russian rail networks were
sparse relative to what the Germans needed for transporting war material and tended to
radiate outwards from Moscow. This left the Germans with a relative dearth of usable
railways to transport their vehicles, such as tanks, long distances, and as the retreating
Red Army destroyed their own infrastructure as they went the Germans were forced to
rebuild and replace it in order to make the rail networks usable again.109 This bought
valuable time for the Soviet Union and hampered the Germans’ ability to move armored
vehicles by train, slowing the onslaught into Russia.
In addition to the destruction of their own rail networks to deny the Germans
access to easier transport of war material, the Soviet Union undertook the process of
transporting whole factories eastwards to preserve their war industry.110 Over the course
of the fighting on the Eastern Front, over 1,500 factories were dismantled and moved east
by rail across the Ural Mountains before being rebuilt in semi-permanent structures and
resuming production. 111 In addition to the prior evacuations carried out before the onset
of hostilities, industry in individual districts would be given the order to evacuate or
continue production as the Germans advanced.112 After being moved, the factory
equipment would quickly be reconstructed by work crews assembled from factory
workers and evacuated civilians under NKVD leadership. These crews toiled in winter
weather with minimal accommodations and were frequently comprised largely of
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women.113 Nevertheless, the relocated factories were re-established at a remarkable pace,
with some factories reaching full production again within just three months in their new
locations.114 Despite the confusion of the relocations and evacuations, the feat of moving
so much industry eastwards on short notice was remarkable in its effectiveness, keeping
the Soviet war machine safely out of German hands and providing the USSR with the
tools necessary for the radical increase in wartime production necessary to fuel the Red
Army’s later offensives. Furthermore, the relocations brought a flood of industry to the
sparsely-populated Ural region, rapidly becoming the heartland of Soviet industry. The
Ural city of Chelyabinsk became a hub for armored vehicle production, becoming
informally known as “Tankograd” because of the tens of thousands of tanks, engines, and
millions of munitions that were produced there.115
The relocation of Soviet war industries to the interior proved to be a vital step in
replacing the huge numbers of tanks that were lost in the initial months of combat.
Although thousands of tanks were lost as the Germans advanced towards Moscow, by the
end of the war the Soviet Union possessed more tanks than any other nation despite also
suffering the highest losses of armored units.116 This simple fact illustrates the ability of
Soviet heavy industry to manufacture the vast quantities of armored vehicles necessary
for Soviet Deep Battle philosophy and also illustrates a difference in philosophy
regarding the manufacturing of tanks with other nations. While Germany for example
frequently possessed tanks with more ergonomic designs and more refined controls, guns,
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and optics compared to their Soviet counterparts, tanks of the USSR were rather
barebones in design. Initially even lacking radios, Soviet tanks were generally cramped,
with only the barest accommodations for the crew, and of basic build and sometimes
dubious construction quality. These concessions however made Soviet designs much
easier to mass-produce as they largely lacked overcomplicated components and were
sufficient, if not ideal, for the battlefield conditions they found themselves in. As the
concept of Deep Battle relied on having large numbers of tanks in order to achieve
multiple breakthrough simultaneously, this choice proved to be essential for ultimate
victory.
In addition to requirements for large numbers of tanks to be utilized against the
Germans, the central tenants of armored warfare were changing rapidly as the front
progressed, a fact that was not lost on Soviet leadership. Despite not having a significant
impact on the movement of the front itself, the early successes of the T-34 and KV’s
were recognized as having been the result of the better-armored designs, whereas the
more numerous light tanks had failed. As a result, the production of the T-34 and selfpropelled guns built on its hull became the major priority for Soviet armor production and
production of traditional light tanks was scaled back significantly. This shift in armor
priorities was mirrored and expanded upon by German forces, who also began fielding
heavier and better-armed vehicles like the Tiger 1 and Panther in response to the
appearance of the T-34.117
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The speed and maneuverability of armored vehicles also became a priority. As
tank design progressed over the decades, a clear shift towards faster and more
maneuverable tanks was been an overarching trend, and the transition towards modern
designs was perhaps the most readily apparent during combat on the Eastern Front. At the
start of hostilities, light tanks dominated the battlefields of western Russia by sheer
numbers. These tanks were designed to keep pace with infantry on the battlefield and
could generally only reach a top speed of around 20 miles per hour, with earlier designs
being even slower.118 A notable anomaly to this trend was the Soviet BT-7, a light tank
capable of reaching a top speed of 56 mph on a flat surface, a tremendous speed for the
time period119. Though the sun was setting on the period of light tank dominance, the
speed of the BT-7 would carry over in part to the later T-34, the backbone of Soviet tank
forces during World War 2. The T-34 was capable of reaching a speed of 33 miles per
hour even off-road, despite being a much more heavily armed and armored vehicle than
the earlier BT-series.120 This speed combined with its wide tracks gave the T-34
impressive off-road abilities compared to its many contemporaries, early engine troubles
notwithstanding, and allowed for a much more aggressive use of tanks to complete the
Deep Battle maneuvers that would win the front.
Armor design also underwent significant changes during the war, catalyzed by the
Soviet need for manufacturing efficiency and subsequent German encounters with these
vehicles. Firstly, armor thickness greatly increased over the course of the war. Early light
tanks such as Panzer III or T-26 frequently had only 15mm of armor or even less on all
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surfaces.121 The appearance of the T-34, a medium tank with 45mm of armor at the front
and 40mm everywhere else, proved a shock for German anti-tank weapons in its
battlefield debut. This trend towards thicker armor continued, with the heaviest late-war
designs of both sides frequently possessing armor averaging 100mm thick, with sections
reaching up to 200 mm thick around the superstructure or gun mantlet, in response to
larger main armaments coming into vogue.
Additionally, the pre-angling of armor became a secondary means of obtaining
more protection from armor plating besides increasing rote thickness. When armored
plates are set at an angle to an incoming shot, the amount of material the incoming shell
must pass through to penetrate the tank increases with a greater angle, thus providing
greater protection. The greater the angle a piece of armor is set at, the more “effective
armor” the tank is provided. The T-34 made excellent use of this principle. Its main
armor ranged from 40-45mm in thickness, and set at an angle of 45-60 degrees, providing
over 90mm of effective armor.122 This was the source of the T-34’s near-invulnerability
to enemy fire during Operation Barbarossa. This protection also applied to the KV, which
used similar principles in its armor scheme. This gave the Soviet heavy tank a decisive
advantage in battle against virtually every German tank the vehicles faced in the early
days of the war. As combat dragged on through 1943, new German tanks appeared that
also made use of this design, such as the Panther, Tiger II, and Jagdpanther.123 New
Soviet vehicles would continue to use this principle both to increase their effective armor
protection and to reduce material costs in production.
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Besides the new angling of tank armor, it was independently discovered by the
main combatants in World War 2 that old methods of riveting tanks together presented
serious liabilities for the crew. As rounds struck the vehicle, the rivets could become
dislodged as the armor deformed under the stress of the shot. This caused rivets to fly
around the inside of the tank as deadly pieces of shrapnel, frequently injuring or even
killing crewmembers, even if the original enemy round had not penetrated the vehicle.
This is a form of armor spalling and presented a significant risk to poorly-constructed
vehicles. As a result, welding or casting became the primary methods by which tanks
were constructed. Additionally, as heavier classes of vehicles became commonplace on
the battlefield, Soviet and German vehicles in turn became increasingly bulky in a race to
provide adequate armor to brunt the impacts of high-caliber main gun rounds.
As combat on the front progressed, the average caliber of main guns increased
dramatically, for both the Soviets and German vehicles. German vehicles such as the Pz.
III and Pz. IV were generally armed with guns in the 37-50mm range of calibers with the
occasional low-velocity 75mm howitzer being found as well, most commonly on Stug III
assault guns.124 The numerous Soviet light tanks meanwhile were armed almost solely
with 37mm guns. After encounters with the T-34, German High Command realized that
their current tanks were not adequately armed to fight the T-34, and that the T-34 and KV
were more than a match for German vehicles currently deployed on the front. As a result,
designs were put into production for heavier tanks that could carry the 88mm KwK-36
main gun or similar heavy armament, such as the Tiger 1.125 This weapon was derived
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from the 8.8 cm Flak 18 anti-aircraft gun the Germans had begun using in a direct-fire
role as it was the only weapon they possessed in the early stages of combat on the Eastern
Front that could reliably penetrate the new Soviet vehicles.126 These new German tanks
also boasted much thicker armor, increasing their overall size.
Soviet designers were somewhat slow to react by comparison, with the T-34
remaining in use as the primary Soviet tank, despite its armor being far from invulnerable
and its gun no longer capable of penetrating heavy German vehicles from the front. In
February of 1944 it was finally upgraded to the T-34-85, now utilizing an 85mm main
gun that gave the tank new fighting potential against heavy German vehicles.127
Additionally, new Soviet tank destroyers and heavy tanks such as IS-2, SU-152, ISU-152,
and SU-100 carrying main guns in the 100mm-152mm range were deployed to counteract
the heaviest German vehicles, with great success.128 These vehicles were vastly better
armed and armored than their earlier counterparts such as ZIS-3 or SU-76. Boasting
massive guns utilizing high-explosive shells to destroy German vehicles via shock wave
rather than direct penetration, these vehicles were much easier to produce in large
numbers than their German counterparts. Their relative lack of specialized components
and simple designs derived from vehicles with similar design principles made these selfpropelled guns relatively cheap and easily mass-produced, while remaining combateffective.
In addition to standards for armor, mobility, and armament for tanks increasing
greatly as the Second World War progressed, so too did the role of tanks themselves
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change. One marked difference in immediate post-war tank design is the movement away
from a great diversity of types of tank “classes” of light, medium, and heavy tanks
towards the concept of the modern main battle tank. Main battle tanks combine the
elements of superior firepower, mobility, and armored protection into a single vehicle,
shying away from the various tank classes that defined tank combat during the interwar
and WW2 eras.129 A close examination of tank combat on the Eastern Front can provide
an explanation as to why this is so. Given the advancements in tank development made
during this time, from increasing firepower, to angling armor to increase protection, and
equipping medium and heavy tanks with newer engines that gave them greater speed, it
gradually became possible to design tanks such as the T-34 that combined these
characteristics into a single vehicle. This process simplified vehicle production
considerably, and while other models of tanks and tank destroyers still saw heavy usage,
the T-34 formed the bulk of the USSR’ tank forces by the end of the war, despite also
taking the heaviest losses.130 The increased armament and firepower of the T-34 without
sacrificing speeds previously relegated to light tanks proved to be trend-setting. As
heavier German vehicles became the norm, the T-34 was upgraded to the T-34-85 with a
new 85mm main armament, a radical increase in caliber from the 37mm guns found on
most pre-war tanks while maintaining its original speed, an important first step towards
contemporary tank design.
Heavy tanks saw a similar trend towards increased armor protection without
sacrificing speed. The KV tanks that fought alongside the T-34 in the early years of
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fighting were phased out of production by 1943, as their similar armor protection to the
T-34 was not justified in the eyes of Soviet High Command by their increased cost of
production. Instead, the Iosef Stalin, or IS class of heavy tanks entered service.131 These
vehicles boasted far superior mobility to the KV-class, as well as increased armor
protection, despite weighing less than their KV predecessors. This was accomplished by
the IS-2’s smaller physical profile than the KV-2, as well as shifting much of the armor to
the front of the vehicle where the most enemy fire was expected.132 Simultaneously, the
IS-2 carried a powerful 122mm main armament, continuing the trend of tanks boasting
increased firepower over the course of the war.133 This trend of single-purpose heavy
tanks becoming obsolete in favor of more mobile vehicles boasting heavy tank-equivalent
firepower continued long after the fighting on the Eastern Front ended and heralded the
arrival of the main battle tank as the principal armored vehicle in modern warfare. The
Soviet Union in particular encouraged this trend by making use of a select group of
versatile vehicles to form the bulk of production, encouraging simplified, easy-to
maintain designs that balanced speed, armor, and firepower into a single weapons
platform that could be easily mass-produced.
As tank development and production was refined and streamlined, the tide of war
on the Eastern Front gradually shifted to the Soviet’s favor, despite the appearances of
increasingly heavier enemy armor on the battlefield. The T-34 and KV were no longer
the invulnerable steel behemoths that had caught the Wehrmacht by surprise during
Operation Barbarossa, but the USSR was now producing tanks at a rapid pace and was
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able to bolster their armored forces despite the massive losses suffered in the early stages
of the war. Further, production became focused almost exclusively on the T-34, with this
single vehicle compromising over 55% of Soviet armored vehicles by the end of the
war.134 Even as the Red Army was repeatedly defeated and pushed back to the gates of
Moscow and Stalingrad, Soviet tank development was continually refined and iterated
on, as the light tanks that dominated the Soviet mechanized corps in the early days of
fighting gave way to thousands of T-34’s. These medium tanks were supplemented by
heavier vehicles such as KV-1’s and 2’s, SU-series self-propelled guns, and ultimately
the IS-series heavy tank. Additionally, Soviet tactics changed dramatically with the
introduction of radios and more reliable equipment for their vehicles. Taking advantage
of their superior numbers and ability to replenish combat losses, Soviet Deep Battle
philosophy became an essential component of the war effort and led to the total defeat of
the Germans’ Army Group Center and ultimately Nazi Germany.
Overview of Major Engagements in the Eastern Theatre:
This next section will cover the general flow of combat in the east post-1941.
Although Axis powers were able to take over huge swaths of Soviet territory, their
offensives ground to a halt at Leningrad, Moscow, and Stalingrad. After heavy fighting
through 1942, the tide of war changed to favor the Soviet Union and the momentum of
the front was firmly in their favor by 1943. With this newfound fervor, massively
increased vehicle production, and new tank designs, the Red Army was able to halt the
German advance in the north by winter of 1941 and in the south around the Volga in the
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winter of 1942. Hereafter, German forces would largely be on the defensive, though they
continued to field increasingly heavy armored vehicles to stem the veritable tidal wave of
T-34 medium tanks being fielded by Soviet forces. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union
continued to refine their own armor designs, resulting in the T-34-85 medium tank, IS-2
heavy tank, and SU-152 and ISU-152 tank destroyers being fielded from 1943 onwards,
paving the way for the ultimate victory in the theater against the existential threat posed
by Nazi Germany.
In the aftermath of Operation Barbarossa and the subsequent Operation Typhoon,
the German advance ground to a halt. This led to the formation of a massive front
characterized by brutal combat, encirclements, and tank usage in unprecedented numbers.
As winter set in, the Wehrmacht’s assault on Moscow stopped short just 30 kilometers
from the Kremlin, and similarly in the south as Germany took control of Rostov in the
south but was unable to hold the city due to overextended supply lines.135 The Germans
encountered the T-34 and similar heavy Soviet vehicles in significant at the Battle of
Brody, one of the largest tank battles in history.136 Despite the ultimate Soviet defeat, the
unexpected appearance of Soviet vehicles virtually immune to German fire kickstarted
development in Germany on heavier vehicles that would characterize armored
engagements in later years. The direct threat to Moscow was eliminated as fresh units
were transferred in from far eastern Russia, upon Japan’s declaration of neutrality
towards the USSR.137 Additionally, the successful evacuation of Soviet industry to the
Urals ensured that the Soviet war machine would be able to maintain production levels
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and supply the Red Army for years to come. Meanwhile, the Stavka launched the Winter
Offensive of 1941-42, seeking to rout Army Group North with offensives led by
battalions of ski-troops as well as airborne infantry, meant to drop behind enemy lines
and encircle their foes.138 The parachute actions largely failed, but overall the situation of
the fighting in the north improved slightly, with Soviet forces advancing 70-100 km into
territory previously held by Army Group North, securing the northern section of the front
and Moscow for the immediate future.139
Even as Moscow was secured against the Nazi threat, Axis troops continued to
advance south towards the Caucasus during 1942. This offensive, known as Case Blue,
was to be a further advancement of the progress made during Operation Barbarossa the
previous year. Two objectives were to be completed, with Army Group South being
subdivided into Army Group A and Army Group B.140 The first objective was to secure
the Baku oilfields and cross the Caucasus, while the second was to secure this advance by
controlling the Volga river and the important industrial city of Stalingrad. The oilfields
were of immense importance to Nazi Germany because of the heavy level of
mechanization of its armed forces.141 The Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine, and Panzerwaffe all
demanded enormous amounts of oil in order to function, and at the outbreak of war
Germany imported 85% of its oil, primarily from the United States, Venezuela, and Iran.
The blockade that came into effect after the invasion of Poland largely cut off Germany
from these resources, leaving them dependent on synthetic oil and the oilfields of
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Romania. 142 As Romanian supplies began to dwindle in late 1941, the need for the
supplies of the Caucasus became critical to the German war effort. Additionally, taking
the Baku oilfields would deprive the Soviet Union of approximately 80% of its own oil,
dealing a severe blow to the USSR’s logistics and mechanized corps.143 Luckily for the
USSR this would never occur, the panzer divisions were unable to push on to Baku when
faced with heavy Soviet resistance and the limited range of their aircraft to provide cover.
Upon reaching the outskirts of Ordzhonikidze, the Germans were finally forced to retreat
and the offensive halted.144 With the totality of Army Group South stopped in the south at
Ordzhonikidze and Stalingrad respectively, the German advance was largely halted, and
would not hold out long-term in the face of increasing Soviet opposition.
As Army Group A attempted to take the Caucasus region, Army Group B moved
to secure the city of Stalingrad to the north. In addition to serving as an important
manufacturing hub, Stalingrad had a significant amount of propaganda value attached to
it as a symbol of its namesake, Josef Stalin. As such, Stalingrad became the site of the
largest battle in human history, with over 1.1 million Soviet casualties and as many as
800,000 Axis casualties over the five months of combat.145 The Battle of Stalingrad was
marked by intense urban fighting and the use of snipers, with the traditional roles of tanks
largely being supplanted by infantry in close-quarters engagements. Armored vehicles
were often used as roadblocks and stationary fighting positions instead.146 However, a
key plant in Stalingrad that produced T-34’s continued to do so despite German forces
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closing to within several blocks, sending T-34’s fresh off the assembly line directly into
combat without paint or extensive testing of the vehicles’ systems.147 In November 1942,
after months of intense fighting, the Soviets launched Operation Uranus, a pair of
armored spearheads across the Don river in flanking maneuvers that surrounded the city,
leaving the German 6th army trapped inside. The 6th Army was unable to break out and
ran critically low on supplies after a failed airlift attempt, leading to their surrender in
January of 1943. Due to the massive scale of Stalingrad and the fact that the Volga
offensive was one of the last launched by Germany on this front, the Battle of Stalingrad
is considered to be a critical turning point in the war as a whole. With Stalingrad
surrounded, the Red Army was able to march westwards towards Kursk and Kharkov.
After intense combat, a well-fortified salient was established at Kursk but Kharkov’s key
factories fell once more into German hands in the face of a stiff counterattack by SS
Tiger battalions.148
As the summer of 1943 arrived, Hitler grew desperate to make a last great
offensive in the east to buy time to pivot his forces against the encroaching Western
Allies. It was decided that Operation Citadel, an offensive to cut off the Soviet’s salient at
Kursk, should be launched to secure the southern portion of the front. 149 However, armed
with intercepted German communications provided by British intelligence, the USSR has
adequate time to prepare defenses.150 These consisted of deep belts of interlocking antitank guns and minefields designed specifically to slow an advance by German armor.
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German forces in turn delayed beginning the offensive in favor of waiting for new
heavier armored vehicles like the then-new Panther medium tank and Elefant tank
destroyer, as well as additional Tigers. After several days of fighting, Soviet forces had
lost over 5,000 tanks and taken over 300,000 casualties, with many of these occurring at
Prokhorovka, where a major armored engagement occurred.151 Despite these losses, the
German offensive was repulsed and the salient remained in Soviet hands. This
engagement proved to be the last strategic-level offensive the Wehrmacht was able to
mount in the East; the Battle of Kursk and subsequent offensives placed the momentum
of the front for the remainder of the war firmly on the side of the Soviet Union.
Moreover, new German armor designs were unable to overcome the superior numbers of
Soviet armored vehicles present, while they also proved vulnerable to new Soviet selfpropelled guns such as the SU-152. This became a common trend as the war progressed
from 1943 to 1945, though Germany continued to field increasingly well-armed and
armored vehicles, the Soviet Union countered with increasing numbers of tanks that were
competent enough for their roles, if not ideal, and much cheaper to produce.
By the summer of 1944 Germany was fully on the defensive, with weakened units
being forced to retreat further and further through conquered territory towards Berlin.152
Despite continuing to suffer heavy losses on Soviet forces, the Red Army was
consistently able to provide new reserves and material for the war effort to replenish their
forces. By June of 1944, Army Group Center was the lone holdout in the front holding
eastern territory, stubbornly defending Belorussia. Despite this massive salient, German

151
152

(Erickson 2015) Location 2679
(D. Glantz, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler 2015) Location 5071

60

High Command thought that any further Soviet offensives would occur in the south,
where routes to Berlin and the Romanian oil fields would be more direct. Additionally,
the Western Allies’ landings at Normandy had diverted German troops to defend the new
Western front in France.
Meanwhile, Soviet forces were allowing the Germans to believe that this was the
case, while secretly moving dozens of divisions north in preparation to enter modern-day
Belarus. This technique, known as maskirovka, was codified Russian doctrine utilizing
military deception techniques to hide the movements of friendly forces and upcoming
plans to inflict maximum surprise on the enemy.153 After all 120 Soviet divisions were in
place, they swept through the German lines with Operation Bagration, liberating
Belorussia and shattering Germany’s Army Group Center.154 The overwhelming forces
that the Soviets were able to bring to bear in this engagement was a prime example of
“Deep Battle”, where Soviet forces created huge breakthroughs in the German lines
before pouring fresh units through the breaches to completely dismantle the enemy’s
logistics networks, as well as encircling their front lines and removing the enemy forces
from the battle space.155 Tanks were an essential component of these breakthrough units,
as highly mobile heavy weapons were critical for disrupting enemy supply chains and
surround vast numbers of German infantry. With over 4,000 tank and assault guns
committed to this offensive, the Red Army was able to quickly surround entire armies
and overwhelm German tanks present through sheer numbers. With this action
completed, the Soviet Union regained huge amounts of territory from German control,
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and with the severe losses suffered Germany was forced to transfer units from the Italian
front to the East to bolster their lines.
By April of 1945, Nazi Germany’s fate was sealed but the forces of the Third
Reich fought practically to the last man to defend Berlin, the capitol. As Soviet forces
approached the city, heavy fighting took place at the Seelow Heights, known as the gates
of Berlin the Red Army committed hundreds of thousands of men to single-handedly
taking the capitol and suffered enormous casualties in men and armor. 156 With the outer
suburbs captured, the Red Army proceeded to surround the city, completely cutting
Berlin off from the outside world. Throughout the battle, huge amounts of shelling took
place, with the Red Army dropping more ordnance on the city than the Western Allies
had in their bombing campaigns the two previous years. The main goals were to disrupt
German defensive lines and remove critical enemy strongholds like the massive flak
towers that had been repurposed for use against Soviet ground forces, but German forces
offered stiff resistance, nonetheless. Despite the significant breakdown in military
structure at this point in the war, German forces comprised mainly of Volkssturm and
Hitlerjugend militia forces armed with Panzerfausts and any military surplus available
held off the final defeat for nine days.157 In addition to the militia forces, Wehrmacht and
scattered groups of tanks participated in the fighting. With many units drastically reduced
in size from previous fights, haphazard groups of tanks and infantry were assigned to
defend various sectors. Nearly every German armored vehicle then in production saw
combat in some degree at Berlin, from early-model Tiger 1’s that fought near the
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Brandenburg Gate to Panther medium tanks dug into the ground as fixed emplacements.
In an interesting historical twist, a pair of destroyed Mark V British WW1-era tanks were
found in the city center. While it is unclear to what extent if any they participated in the
battle, it seems that they were originally captured from the White Russian Army by the
victorious Red Army during the Communist Revolution in Russia. This pair of vehicles
were in turn captured by German troops in Smolensk during their advance into the USSR
years later, before being sent back to Berlin and eventually being destroyed in the
fighting in 1945.
Meanwhile, Soviet forces advanced into the city, with units of submachinegun
troops covering tank’s vulnerable flanks and tops from Panzerfaust attacks from
defending Volkssturm troops. These cheap disposable antitank weapons inflicted many
Soviet armored casualties during the fighting in previous engagements, so having ground
troops to make up for the tanks’ limited visibility in dense urban environments was of
prime importance. Tanks and tank destroyers of all kinds saw combat, with primary
contributing vehicles consisting of the T-34-85, IS-2, and ISU-152 due to their enclosed
nature, powerful armaments, and comparatively safer use in urban environments. The
ISU-152 in particular saw heavy use destroying enemy-held buildings, its original
purpose before being pressed into service as a heavy tank destroyer. As the Red Army
continued to push into the city, their armored units’ advance was stalled in places by
Berlin’s flak towers, massive concrete fortifications fitted with antiaircraft guns
originally designed to protect the city from bombing raids. Now they turned their 128mm
main armaments towards the ground, halting the Soviet tank advance towards the city
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center.158 Despite the immense Soviet bombardment of the city, these fortifications were
able to withstand direct 203mm mortar fire, and thus were not captured until their
garrisons surrendered at the end of the battle159. Meanwhile, Soviet troops captured
significant installations such as the Reichstag and Tempelhof Airport, at great cost, and
pressed German civilians into service clearing the runways for use by the Red Air Force.
After several days of fighting, the German defenders were split in half, then gradually
reduced to small isolated pockets of only the most fanatical troops, who were eliminated
from strongpoints after the German surrender by simply reducing their buildings to
rubble.
With Hitler dead and the Wehrmacht shattered, VE day arrived on May 2nd, 1945,
ending years of fighting that devastated Europe, and leaving Imperial Japan as the sole
Axis power to face the combined might of the Allied forces. As the fighting in Berlin
came to a close, surviving German civilians were fed at Red Army soup kitchens, while
any uniformed services, from fire-fighters to military and Volkssturm were rounded up
and sent to the east as prisoners of war.160 Though the fighting was over, widespread
looting and rapes were reported as the vengeful Red Army took what they felt was their
right as the spoils of war after years of fighting across thousands of miles and the
devastation to their homeland suffered at German hands. Stalin was reported as having
stated in response to the allegations, “I understand it if a soldier who has crossed
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thousands of kilometers through blood and fire and death has fun with a woman or takes
some trifle.”161

161

(Djilas 2014) 95

65

Part 3: Soviet Tank Development
While tanks proved to be a critical component of many countries’ ground forces
during the war, their designs changed significantly as the war progressed. Design
differences between nations are also readily apparent, based on aesthetic decisions,
differing manufacturing methods, and battlefield priorities. As opposed to their German
counterparts who prioritized crew ergonomics and manufacturing quality in their tank
designs, the Soviet Union focused primarily on making tanks that were cheap to produce
and easy to manufacture. In addition, the Soviet Union always prioritized having large
numbers of tanks in its inventory once armored vehicles became a battlefield mainstay.
Throughout the war the Soviet Union generally possessed between 4 and ten times the
number of armored vehicles that Nazi Germany did on the Eastern Front.162 This was
especially important for enacting the “Deep Battle” strategy developed by Soviet
strategists, as large numbers of fresh combat units would be called upon to exploit the
multiple breakthroughs made by the initial wave of troops. Despite this strategy being
largely sidelined in the aftermath of Stalin’s purges and only gradually being re-learned
in the latter half of the war, the large numbers of tanks produced for such a strategy
arguably helped elevate the USSR’s manufacturing ability in the pre-war period. This
experience proved vital to the massive rebuild of the USSR’s industrial capacity postevacuation, as many factories in western sectors had to be broken down and moved east
to preserve the Soviet Union’s war material.163
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With the stated goals of tanks needing to be competent, cheap, and reliable, some
common trends among Soviet armor design become apparent. Contrasting with their
German counterparts, Soviet armored vehicles commonly utilized features such as rough
construction with rather “lenient” quality assurance, cast turrets, angled armor, wider
tracks, cramped crew compartments, and larger-caliber guns. These features made Soviet
tanks visually distinct from their German counterparts and also highlight the USSR’s
goals of manufacturing their vehicles cheaply and in great quantities. Rudimentary
manufacturing techniques compared to the Germans, as well as the severe reliability
issues experienced by early Soviet designs also highlight the relative youth of the Soviet
Union’s industrial and manufacturing sector compared to Western Europe and Germany
at the time. Nevertheless, as the war progressed, Soviet tanks became more refined in
their construction, as well as better armed and armored, leading to the USSR possessing
the largest and most heavily-armed tank forces in the world at the end of the war.
To better understand the influence of Soviet tank design on the outcome of the
war, several vehicles of various types from throughout the war will be examined in
greater detail to illustrate how Soviet priorities in armor design evolved over the course
of the fighting. The Nazis began fielding significantly heavier armored vehicles from
1942 onwards that existing Soviet designs could not effectively engage. Additionally,
older designs rapidly became obsolete and required updated parts or outright
replacement, necessitating the development of new vehicles. To this end, the following
tanks will be examined in greater detail: The T-34 medium tank, the KV heavy tank
family, the SU-76 self-propelled gun, the SU-152 and ISU-152 self-propelled guns, the
SU-100 tank destroyer, and the IS-2 heavy tank. These vehicles, particularly the T-34,
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epitomize Soviet design ideals during the war, and were produced in massive quantities
to repel the might of the Wehrmacht.
The T-34 Medium Tank:
There is perhaps no other tank that epitomizes Soviet armor during the Second
World War as much as the T-34 medium tank. The T-34and its variants comprised over
55% of all armored vehicles being fielded by the Soviet Union by the end of the war,
becoming by far the most ubiquitous Soviet vehicle on the battlefields of the Eastern
Front. 164165 Notably well-armed and armored by the standards of the day, the T-34’s
rugged and cheap manufacturing allowed this highly versatile medium tank’s design to be
gradually upgraded over the course of the war to both save costs and improve its
effectiveness as a fighting vehicle. Bringing an unprecedented level of firepower, speed,
and armor in a single package to the battlefield, the T-34 has frequently been cited as one
of the most effective and versatile designs of the war and proved to be a revolutionary
step in tank design that spurred development towards the “universal tank”. Additionally,
the T-34 was one of the longest-serving armored vehicles of the Soviet Union, remaining
in continuous service from the initial German invasion through the end of the war in
Europe in May 1945 and well into the Cold War. In practically every major armored
engagement of the Eastern Front, the T-34 comprised the bulk of Soviet armored forces
on the field, serving as a versatile armored vehicle for a variety of offensive operations.
In addition, the T-34’s base hull design was converted into variant vehicles to serve more
niche purposes as the war progressed, from the casemate-style SU-85 and SU-100 tank
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destroyers to the OT-34 flamethrower tank. Though by the end of the war the T-34 was
no longer the nigh-invincible fighting machine it was in 1941 and tens of thousands had
been lost to enemy fire, the T-34 was undoubtedly a pivotal vehicle that influenced tank
design for decades to come.
When the T-34 first entered service one of its most remarkable features was its
speed, particularly for a tank of its size. Its speed however was unprecedented for a
medium tank. When tanks were first introduced to the battlefield during World War 1,
they were pushing the limits of mechanical technology of the day with the engines they
equipped. This was not considered a major disadvantage however, as tanks were initially
conceived as only moving with infantry to provide cover and fire support and so speed
was not a major priority. This philosophy changed with tanks of the late war and interwar
periods as engine technology improved and the revolutionary French tank Renault FT
entered service. This was one of the first tank to use a modern configuration of placing
the main armament in a fully-traversable turret rather than the hull, and this new gun
mobility as well as the Renault’s speed changed tank design forever. With improving
engine technology tanks could now reach a much greater top speed than World War 1-era
designs, though high mobility was still limited to lightweight vehicles. In the Soviet
Union, this led to large numbers of light tanks being produced in the pre-war period,
slower-moving T-26 infantry tanks to support ground troops, and much faster BT-series
tanks. The speed of the latter was due to the use of the Christie suspension, of American
design, which permitted the use of large roadwheels working in concert with tank treads
to propel a tank to much greater speeds; the BT-7 was able to reach 86 kilometers per
hour on roads, and 50 km/h when traveling cross-country.
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The T-34 kept this suspension system but used the powerful Model V-2-34 engine
to maintain a relatively high speed of 53 km/h despite its considerable weight increase
compared to earlier Soviet armored vehicles. 166 As the war progressed, this engine was
optimized to produce more power in order to maintain the vehicle’s mobility as
additional armor and other components were added with versions such as the T-34-85.
With this engine, the T-34 was now able to traverse the battlefield at speeds once only
achievable by lighter scouting vehicles. This dramatic shift in engine power enabled the
Soviet Union to pivot tank production almost exclusively towards the T-34, as vehicles
that would have once been used to fill niche roles like scouting were now superfluous.
Additionally, the T-34 used a diesel engine with a pneumatic starting system, which
allowed it to operate much more reliably in the cold Russian winters and made the
vehicle more resistant to catching fire.167 The T-34 also utilized wide treads that helped it
travel cross-country as well as “float” to some degree above mud and snow, preventing it
from being bogged down in the bi-annual rasputitsa, or mud season, like its narrowtracked German counterparts.168
In addition to its unprecedented speed for a vehicle of its size, the T-34 also used
an innovative armor layout that granted it dramatically better protection than other
vehicles in its class. The T-34’s armor gave the tank a distinct trapezoidal appearance due
to its significant angling. Despite the alien look compared to other tanks of the day, this
armor scheme provided excellent protection due to the angling, the T-34 model 1941 had
effectively 60mm or greater of armor on all sides due to this unique scheme. After the
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initial shock of encountering the T-34 in combat, new German tanks began to incorporate
similar designs to take advantage of the additional protection without increasing armor
thickness. In addition to providing greater protection, the tank’s trapezoidal appearance
reduced the vehicle’s surface area, simultaneously creating a smaller target for enemy
gunners, cutting the cost of materials needed to construct the vehicle, and streamlining
production due to the simple overall shape. The downside to this was that the reduced
surface area also reduced the internal volume of the vehicle, contributing to cramped
conditions for crewmembers.169 Additionally, the welded construction rather than riveting
of the armored plates together removed one source of spalling, a frequent cause of crew
injury to tanks of the period. Upon being struck by enemy fire, riveted armor plates tend
to bulge inwards, such that even if the enemy projectile does not penetrate the vehicle
rivets and fragments can fly off the plate and cause severe injury or death to the crew
inside the vehicle.170
The T-34 lost much of its initial invulnerability as the war progressed, as upgrades
to its armor layout generally occurred more slowly than the opposing Germans were able
to field more heavily-armed tanks. Additionally, Soviet industry was able to replenish
losses and so improving the tank’s armor at the expense of its mobility was not
considered to be a high priority. Indeed, despite taking heavy losses during the years of
combat, the T-34 emerged from World War 2 as the most-produced tank of the war, with
over 56,000 vehicles produced. The T-34 was by May 1945 the most numerous tank by
far in the Soviet inventory, an astonishing feat due to their high losses. Almost 40% of all
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T-34’s produced during the war were lost, either due to combat, breakdown, or
intentional destruction by their crews to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. 171
Nevertheless, the T-34 evolved significantly from its original 1941 configuration
over the following years. Throughout its life the T-34 received numerous upgrades to its
main armament and crew ergonomics, as well as its armor. Though upgrades to the hull
were incremental through 1943, the upgraded T-34-85 entered full production it boasted
significant changes. The new version included 90mm equivalent of frontal hull armor as
well as a newly expanded turret.172 This housed both the new 85mm main gun and
provided additional protection for the crew, with additional armor added to the turret on
all sides as well as an upgraded gun mantlet. Additionally, quality control and metallurgy
improved significantly over the course of the war; while many early model T-34’s had
cracks and gaps in their armor, as well as weak turret castings, general armor quality
improved significantly in the later stages of the war. 173 Finally, some T-34’s received
additional armor by way of applique armor plates, steel plates attached to the tank once
the vehicles were in the field.174
In addition to its revolutionary mobility and armor schemes, the T-34’s main
armament was also notable. At the outset of the war, standard armaments on tanks were
much lower caliber than by the end of the war. 37mm was a standard caliber used on
many tanks of the day, notably among German vehicles serving on the Eastern Front such
as the Panzer III. Despite the anticipation that many of their tanks would need to be
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upgraded with heavier weapons eventually, the presence of the T-34 prioritized this size
increase. In addition to its armor, the T-34 used a comparatively large 76mm main
cannon, more than adequate for knocking out any armored vehicle the Germans were
fielding at this stage of the war. To better combat these new vehicles, the Panzer III’s
planned upgrade was accelerated as it was fitted with a 50mm main gun, and the Panzer
IV was refitted with the L75 75mm main gun.175 New German tanks and tank destroyers
would be fitted with 75 and 88mm guns, as 75/76mm armament became a new battlefield
standard. Though the T-34’s 76mm gun was reasonably accurate, it suffered when
penetrating later German tanks such as the Tiger and Panther.
In the later stages of the war as encounters with heavier German armor became
more often, the 76mm gun the T-34 was equipped with was determined to be inadequate
for the needs of the Red Army.176 The T-34 was completely unable to penetrate vehicles
such as Tiger 1, Panther, and Ferdinand from the front, and only at close range from the
sides and rear.177 This compromised Soviet tankers’ ability to engage targets effectively
at long ranges as these heavier vehicles became commonplace on the battlefield. After
research and experimentation, the T-34 was equipped with a new 85mm gun and redesignated T-34-85.178 This new gun gave the T-34 a much-needed boost in firepower,
enabling it to engage heavy German armor with much greater effectiveness than with the
old gun. The larger faster round was capable of penetrating the Tiger 1 through its
thickest frontal armor from 500 meters, putting the T-34-85 on more equal footing with
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its heavier opponent though the T-34-85’s armor still could not match the sheer thickness
of the Tiger. 179 Due to its larger size, the new 85mm cannon necessitated a larger turret
be developed for the T-34-85, physically distinguishing the tank from its predecessors.
This new turret provided a key logistics improvement for the operation of the tank in the
form of space for an extra crewmember, as well as some additional armor. This extra
crewmember took on some of the gun-loading duties from the previously overburdened
tank commander, greatly increasing operational efficiency.180
Though the T-34 was a highly influential tank design and undoubtedly helped the
Soviet Union beat the Axis powers, the tank was not a perfect machine. In the early days
of deployment, the tank faced numerous issues relating to its general unreliability, poor
internal layout, issues with gun handling and optics, and general cheap construction
negatively impacted the vehicle’s performance. As the war progressed many of these
issues would be addressed through improved construction methods that both reduced the
cost of production while gradually improving the T-34 and other vehicles in the Soviet
arsenal. Major upgrades such as the transition from the base T-34 to the T-34-85 also
greatly improved the tank’s usability and battlefield performance.
When the T-34 first entered service, it used a much narrower, 2-man turret than its
later iteration the T-34-85. While minor variances in cast versus riveted construction
existed alongside cosmetic differences between factories, the interior structure and
operation of the early T-34 turrets remained the same. This proved to be a critical
weakness that severely hindered the tank’s ability to operate effectively. With the two-
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man configuration, the commander of a given vehicle was forced to aim and fire the gun,
in addition to coordinating the rest of the crew and acquiring targets.181 German tank
crews noticed this deficiency and slow rate of fire of the T-34’ gun, due to the
multitasking by the commander.182 In addition, the small turret was a physically cramped
space, and so the later 3-man turret of the T-34-85 greatly increased operational
efficiency as well as mounting a larger weapon. The addition of an extra crewmember to
serve as a dedicated gunner relieved the overburdened commander and allowed targets to
be engaged more quickly.
Operational deficiencies with the T-34’s turret extended further than it’s cramped
interior space. The various T-34 and T-34-85 models also lacked a turret basket, a key
feature of modern tanks.183 A turret basket is a section of the floor of the tank that rotates
with the turret as it turns, providing a stable platform from which to man the gun in any
direction. The T-34 and later T-34 -85 lacked this feature, as a result the tank’s loader
was at serious risk of injury if the turret were to turn expectedly and at speed.184 This
problem was further compounded by the storage of much of the tank’s ammunition in
boxes under mats on the floor of the vehicle, creating the surface on which the crew stood
and fought. Once a T-34 in combat expended its “ready” ammunition stored in racks on
the insides of the turret and hull, more ammunition would need to be brought up from
these boxes. This created a mess of open ammunition containers, grease, rubber matting
and spent shell casings that further increased the risk of injury to standing crewmembers
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and slowed operations of the vehicle during combat. This problem was never fully
addressed apart from the gunner and commander’s seats being attached to the turret, the
loaders of the T-34 and later T-34-85 were forced to remain light on their feet in the heat
of battle and contort themselves around the rotating gun breech.
Another critical weakness of the T-34 was its lack of a radio in the early
production models.185 At the outset of combat on the Eastern Front, radios had become a
standard feature of practically all German tanks, a necessity for the close coordination
blitzkrieg tactics required, however this was not the case for Soviet vehicles. 186 Radios
were rare, even for command tanks in 1941, and so crews communicated instead with
signal flags and by staying within visual and auditory range of one another, or by using
pre-planned patrol routes.187 These limited the range of the T-34 severely, shortening the
distances at which they could operate from command centers, and these issues were
compounded by the vehicle’s other reliability issues. Later in the war radios became
standard issue, but at the outset of hostilities the lack of communication equipment
severely hampered coordination between individual units and Soviet leadership. This was
noted by German troops in early T-34 encounters who remarked on the vehicle’s notable
armor, but also stated that the T-34’s fired slowly and rarely concentrated their firepower
on a single vehicle.188 Instead Soviet commanders were searching for targets
independently, which was made even more difficult due to the vehicle’s mediocre optics
and viewports.189 At the command level, Soviet tank battalions were poorly coordinated
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due to incompetent leadership and poor tactics, both of which were exacerbated by the
lack of radios and led to poor coordination of armor and the loss of hundreds of vehicles
in the face of the well-organized German onslaught.
Finally, a discussion of the issues with early model T-34’s would not be complete
without mentioning the engine. Despite the innovative wide tracks that allowed the T-34
to ride over mud and snow without becoming bogged down, the early models suffered
from engine reliability issues that caused hundreds of vehicle losses and severely
hindered the T-34’s operational effectiveness at the outset of the war.190 Shifting gears
was difficult, as one American report noted, and transmissions were unreliable with early
models. 191 The transmission was so prone to failure in fact that several T-34’s drove to
engage the Germans during Operation Barbarossa with extra transmissions cabled to their
engine decks, to replace the installed one when it failed.192 Additionally, the engine filters
on early T-34’s were totally ineffective. Examined Soviet vehicles at the Aberdeen
proving ground revealed that the dust filters on the T-34 tested permitted large amounts
of particulates into the engine, quickly and irreparably damaging various components.193
Later Cyclone and Multi-Cyclone filters on later T-34 and T-34-85 models solved these
issues and led to much greater engine reliability despite the huge cost cuts achieved as the
manufacturing process was refined. Finally, the all-steel tracks of the T-34 were also
unreliable upon initial deployment. Despite being made of steel, the tracks were of quite
light construction and were prone to tearing on sharp turns.194 Additionally, the pins that
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held the segments together could easily come loose and lead to the vehicle becoming
immobilized. These issues would be fixed via improved metallurgy and a small metal
plate welded to the exterior of the tank that would force the pins back into place as they
rotated past.
In summary, the T-34 was a highly innovative, if imperfect medium tank of the
Second World War. Despite its shortcomings, the tank introduced many novel design
features including high speed for a tank of its size, a high caliber gun, wider tracks,
sloped armor, and the extensive use of cast components in its construction, that would
have a dramatic impact on future tank design. Though the tank was plagued by poor crew
training, ergonomics, engine issues, and a critical lack of communication equipment, the
T-34 gave the Germans serious pause upon their first encounters. Its revolutionary armor
layout for its size and high gun caliber set a new standard for future armored vehicles,
and the T-34 quickly reached record production numbers to become the principle Soviet
battle tank of the second World War. Playing a critical role in ground operations
throughout the fighting on the Eastern Front, the T-34 gave the Soviet Union a rugged
and easy-to-produce solution to the country’s need for modern armored fighting vehicles.
While not a perfect tank, the T-34 made up for its deficiencies via sheer numbers, as well
as incremental upgrades that turned a revolutionary design into a competent fighting
vehicle, the T-34-85, capable of going toe-to-toe with late-war German armor.
KV-Series Heavy Tanks:
In addition to the T-34, another key tank family of the early war period was the
Kliment Voroshilov, or KV series heavy tanks. The KV-1 was the T-34’s new companion
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tank, developed and entered service during the same timeframe. 195 The KV-1 was more
heavily armored than the T-34 and designed to further the concept of a “breakthrough
tank” that had been popularized by the first tanks during World War 1. When tanks first
emerged on the battlefield, their main objective was to break through enemy defenses and
put an end to the stalemate of trench warfare. To this end tanks were built to be very large
and utilize multiple weapon emplacements, while speed was not a priority to allow
infantry to keep up with the lumbering vehicles. After World War 1 new tanks were
designed to be smaller and faster, but the concept of the breakthrough tank remained
popular and thus the KV was born. Utilizing much thicker sloped armor and a heavier
76mm gun than its predecessors, the Soviet Union designed the KV with similar features
to the T-34 but on a larger scale. Weighing 45 tons and measuring almost 7 meters long,
the KV undoubtedly earned its German nickname, the “Russischer Koloss”, or Russian
Colossus from the Wehrmacht troops who faced it.196
Like the T-34, the KV-1 made use of angled armor, which increased effective armor
protection, the same 76mm main gun, and wide tracks that enabled the vehicle to traverse
difficult terrain such as swamps and snow without becoming bogged down. Though its
armor was not set at as shallow an angle as the T-34, the KV’s armor plating was thicker,
at up to 90mm thick in places, granting it similar, if not greater levels of protection.197
Finally, the KV possessed a larger three-man turret from the outset of production that
gave the vehicle similar levels of firepower and greater operating efficiency. In addition
to the 76mm-armed version, the KV-1, other variants of the vehicle were also put into
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production to meet various needs of the battlefield. The KV-1 was the default
configuration and most common variant produced, with over 3,000 units produced.198 At
the outset of Operation Barbarossa it was an effective battlefield weapon, though
numerous vehicles were lost due to poor deployment, communication, and poor strategiclevel maneuvers199. As the Germans advanced into the USSR, several reports emerged of
lone KV’s halting the advance of entire divisions and bouncing dozens of rounds off their
thick armor, coining their nickname.200 Nevertheless, the KV-1 was unable to halt the
German advance by a significant degree and Soviet forces were rapidly pushed back in
1941.
As the war progressed however, upgraded German guns began to take a toll on
existing KV’s, whose armor was no longer invincible. To compensate, post-production
applique armor kits were circulated, with extra armor plates to be welded onto existing
hulls.201 This extra weight slowed the tank down and rendered the KV incompatible with
the realities of the rapidly shifting front. Similarly, the 76mm main gun was no longer as
effective as it once was, and the 300% cost increase of KV production over that of a T34, for less speed and similar combat performance led to the cancellation of this vehicle’s
mass production.202 Another contributing factor was the German advance into the
districts where these heavy tanks were produced. Finally, the vehicle’s difficult handling
led to reduced combat performance, several accounts exist of the KV’s transmission
being so difficult to manipulate that drivers frequently resorted to hitting it into position
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with a sledgehammer.203 Despite production being halted, KV’s would continue to serve
in various capacities through the end of the war on every front the Soviet Union
participated in, and the legacy of this massive tank would lead to the development of
improved Soviet armored vehicles.
In addition to the KV-1, several other variants of the vehicle were constructed, and
contributed significantly to Soviet armored doctrine later in the war. In addition to KV-1,
initial production of the tank called for a version with a 152mm howitzer mounted instead
of the 76mm main gun, for anti-fortification use. This “Heavy Turret KV”, or KV-2,
mounted the requisite gun in a massive cuboid turret, giving it a markedly different
silhouette over the KV-1. 204 While effective in its bunker-busting role, the KV-2 was
ultimately a victim of its mechanical shortcomings and lack of purpose in the defensive
war that characterized Soviet strategy during the early 1940’s. The KV-2 was very slow,
and the enormous weight of the howitzer and custom turret caused turret traverse issues
except on level ground.205 The gun was also difficult to load and handle, and transmission
problems from the KV-1 persisted. Nevertheless, the Red Army’s need for direct-fire
bunker-busting capability persisted throughout the war, and experience with the KV-2 led
to the development of massive late-war Soviet self-propelled guns such as the SU-152
and ISU-152. Besides the KV-1 and 2, other variants were introduced that attempted to
reduce the vehicle’s weight and experiment with new main guns to effectively engage
heavier German armor like the Tiger and Panther. To this effect, the KV-85 and KV-1S
were developed. 206 Mounting a new low-profile turret and the 85mm gun shared with the
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T-34-85, these new heavy tanks improved greatly on their predecessors with more
reliable shifting systems, and much better visibility for their commanders in the form of a
dedicated cupola. However, these new heavy tanks failed to improve performance
significantly over the then-prototype T-34-85 while remaining expensive to produce, and
so both vehicles were short-lived. Several of their key features however, including the
use of a higher-caliber gun and the new turret profile, would live on in the late-war IS
family of heavy tanks, the culmination of Soviet heavy armor design. Finally, another
prototype, the KV-14, experimented with a low-profile casemate design mounting a
massive 152mm howitzer. This tank would go on to be renamed SU-152 and play an
extremely important direct-fire role against the heaviest German armor in the latter half
of the war.
In summary, while the KV was an extraordinarily well-armed and armored tank when
it first entered service, but poor strategy and organization hampered its strengths in the
fast-moving theater of the Eastern Front in 1941. As the war progressed, the tank was
incrementally improved, but ultimately became obsolete compared to the equally
effective but cheaper-to-produce T-34. Ultimately, developments made within the KV
tank family would go on to influence later Soviet designs such as SU-152 and IS-2 and it
remains a prime example of early war heavy tank design.
The SU-76 Self-Propelled Gun:
Even as the T-34 made light tanks largely obsolete with Soviet forces, the need for
mobile artillery that could support fast-moving infantry remained. To this effect, the SU76207 was put into mass production, becoming the second-most-produced armored vehicle
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in the Soviet arsenal after the T-34.208 A versatile self-propelled gun, the SU-76 was used
as an infantry support weapon, tank destroyer, and indirect-fire support roles depending
on the needs of the battlefield. Utilizing a casemate-style superstructure and the chassis of
the T-70 light tank, this lightweight armored vehicle was cheap to produce, and
reasonably effective in its designated roles, if lacking in armor protection. The vehicle
was well-received by the infantry it accompanied due to its speed and ease of
communication with the crew through the open crew compartment, but the vehicle’s
steering was a frequent cause of complaint by its crews. The vehicle’s characteristics
coined the nicknames “suchka” (Little Bitch) and “Golozhopiy Ferdinand” (Naked
Ferdinand), due to the vehicle’s steering and similarity in shape but dearth of armor
compared to the German heavy tank destroyer respectively.209
Produced from 1942 through the end of the war, the vehicle became a mainstay in the
Red Army, serving alongside infantry units through many major campaigns, including
Operation Bagration. Here the SU-76 proved highly useful, being able to effectively
navigate the swampy terrain of Belarus to bypass German fortifications and launch
surprise attacks from behind their lines.210 Its utility was highlighted in such
environments as it was the only Soviet armored vehicle able to operate effectively under
such conditions due to its low ground pressure and light weight. Though the 76mm gun
it carried could not penetrate the heaviest German tanks, the vehicle remained in use
throughout the war and effectively engaged other German light and medium vehicles.
Further, the SU-76 possessed a variety of ammunition types that greatly increased the
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vehicle’s utility, including armor piercing for engaging enemy vehicles, high explosive
and incendiary rounds for leveling fortifications, as well as fragmentation projectiles for
indirect fire.211 After the war, production was halted and the vehicle gradually phased out,
having been made obsolete by more advanced designs. Nevertheless, the SU-76
exemplifies the Soviet doctrine of large numbers of cheap to produce, utilitarian vehicles
that were able to accomplish their battlefield objectives at a low cost.
SU-152 and ISU-152 Heavy Assault Guns:
Though the T-34, SU-76, and other vehicles formed the backbone of the Soviet
arsenal, the Red Army was faced with a persistent need for vehicles capable of destroying
German fortifications and heavy tanks, particularly in the aftermath of the Battle of
Stalingrad.212 Towed artillery was insufficient due to the danger the crew faced operating
exposed, and so the idea for a new armored self-propelled gun was born. Based on the
Chassis of the KV-1 heavy tank, the KV-14 prototype, now known as the SU-152.213
mounted a massive 152mm howitzer protected by 70mm of frontal armor in a casemate
configuration. With the crew protected within an enclosed fighting compartment, the SU152 had a marked advantage over towed artillery, the vehicle could advance alongside
tanks and infantry to directly engage enemy positions even with a rapidly moving front
line. Additionally, the vehicle’s wide body and tracks inherited from the KV-1 enabled
the SU-152 to ride over deep mud and snow more effectively than their wheeled towed
counterparts. Perhaps most importantly, the SU-152 was cheaper to produce than its
ancestor, the pre-war howitzer-wielding KV-2 heavy tank, an important factor when
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constructing the vehicles in recently rebuilt factories in Chelyabinsk.214 After additional
rounds of testing, SU-152 was deemed fit for combat and the first regiments were
deployed to reinforce the Soviet positions at Kursk in the summer of 1943.215
Upon joining the heavy combat at Kursk, it was discovered that the SU-152 was a
highly effective heavy tank destroyer despite not being designed for this purpose. The
heavy high explosive shells fired by its massive main gun dealt catastrophic damage to
any German tank the vehicle faced. The massive concussive blast from the 152mm shell
would kill the enemy crew through sheer blast effect and spalling damage despite not
penetrating the hulls of the tanks themselves.216 Additionally, the blast effect from the
shell would frequently rip the turrets off the tanks hit, including heavy tanks such as the
Tiger 1 and the new Panther medium tank. This reputation earned the vehicle, as well as
its successor the ISU-152, the nickname zveroboy, or “beast killer” from its crews for its
habit of knocking out the heaviest German tanks, commonly named after wild animals.217
218

The SU-152 was even capable of knocking out the Ferdinand tank destroyer in a single

hit, albeit with slightly less success.219 Ferdinands struck by the SU-152 were frequently
able to be pulled off the field at Kursk and returned to service the next day, leading to
standard Soviet policy for SU-152 crews to continue firing at enemy vehicles until they
were completely totaled and/or the turret stripped away.
Despite the destructive potential of the gun it wielded, SU-152 was by no means
invincible. Its 70mm of frontal armor protected the crew from shrapnel, most infantry
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weapons, and low-caliber anti-tank weapons, but SU-152 was still vulnerable to the
88mm gun of the Tiger 1 as well as the long 75mm gun wielded by the Panther medium
tank. Additionally, the crew compartment was cramped due to the large gun breach and
the fire rate was quite slow due to the bulky ammunition.220 As a result, only around 700
SU-152’s were produced, with its successor the ISU-152 improving on the vehicle’s
shortcomings and improving the armor. 221 Nevertheless, surviving SU-152s would
continue to serve until the end of the war, and the accidental discovery of the vehicle’s
effectiveness as a heavy tank destroyer would prove immensely valuable to the Soviet
war effort. Furthermore, the SU-152 performed its primary intended role of fortification
assault admirably and served throughout the Eastern Front and most notably during
Operation Bagration, providing valuable anti-tank and artillery support to the divisions
retaking Belarus from Axis control.
The ISU-152 improved on its predecessor SU-152 in many ways. Built around the IS
heavy tank chassis rather than that of the KV, the ISU-152 inherited the SU-152’s main
armament and multirole tasks of self-propelled artillery support as well as destroying
enemy heavy tanks and tank destroyers. Additionally, some versions of the tank were
equipped with the experimental long-barreled BL-10 152mm gun. Perhaps most notably,
the ISU-152 featured improved armor that gave it total frontal protection from the most
commonly encountered Panzer 4s and Stugs fielded by German forces, and forced even
larger tanks such as the Tiger and Jagdpanther to approach within killing range if they
were to penetrate the tank reliably.222 The vehicle also inherited the destructive 152 mm
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main armament as well as the nickname zveroboy from its predecessor, for its habit of
ripping the turrets off the tanks struck by its massive shells.
In addition to its vaunted anti-tank capabilities, the ISU-152 performed exceedingly
well in urban environments that became more common as the Red Army went on the
offensive and pushed the Germans back. Participating in heavy urban combat in Vienna,
Berlin, and elsewhere, the ISU-152 was used to both bombard cities from a distance as
well as work in close coordination with infantry to level occupied buildings. 223 Though
effective, care had to be taken to avoid injuring friendly troops nearby. One account from
a Soviet tank commander mentions an ISU-152 being given permission to fire on an
enemy position in Vienna, and the blast from the gun being such that not only was the
enemy position annihilated, but several of other buildings on the street suffered damage
and practically every window within several dozen meters was shattered, the broken glass
causing numerous minor injuries to friendly troops.224 Nevertheless, when proper care
was taken the ISU-152 proved to be a highly effective solution to the Red Army’s need
for multipurpose assault guns, filling both support and direct fire roles admirably and
improving on its predecessor’s novel approach to destroying heavy tanks.
Due to the vehicle’s versatility, ISU-152 capitalized on the effectiveness of the Su152 and was produced in massive numbers, underlining its importance to Soviet
commanders. With 1,800 units produced over the course of the war, the roles of support
artillery, assault gun, and heavy tank destroyer combined into a single vehicle was an
attractive option for Soviet leadership, giving the ISU-152 a versatility advantage over

223
224

(Fedorovich 2010) 1
(Fedorovich 2010) 1

87

dedicated tank destroyers such as the SU-100. 225 However, the vehicle did have some
drawbacks, the vehicle inherited the low ammunition store of 20 rounds226 from its
predecessor, and spare ammunition needed to be carried exposed on the back of the tank.
The rounds were also extremely heavy and divided into two parts, shell and charge,
which made loading the gun difficult and reduced the fire rate. This aside however, the
ISU-152 was the only vehicle that remained in production through the end of the war
capable of reliably knocking out the heaviest German armor with a single shot, making it
immensely valuable to the Soviet armored divisions as the Axis produced ever-heavier
tanks to combat the tidal wave of Soviet armor.
The SU-100 Tank Destroyer:
In addition to the heavy assault guns such as SU-152 and ISU-152, the Soviet Union
also produced a few dedicated tank destroyers wielding high-velocity mid-caliber main
guns, in the traditional tank destroyer style. The first of these was the SU-85, a casematestyle tank destroyer utilizing an 85mm gun erected on the chassis of the T-34.227
However, this design quickly became obsolete as the T-34-85 entered production and
heavier German armor became more common on the battlefield, leading to the
development of the SU-100 instead. Mounting a powerful 100mm main gun and
protected by 75mm of frontal armor set at a steep angle, the SU-100 tank destroyer saw
extensive service in the final year of the war and proved to be a formidable foe to latewar German tanks.228 Bearing many visual similarities to the German Jagdpanther tank
destroyer, the SU-100 filled a similar role on the battlefield, knocking out late-war
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medium tanks such as the Panther reliably and filling a niche as a powerful dedicated
tank destroyer in the Soviet Union’s forces. Improving on its predecessors, the SU-100
features a commander’s cupola and 360-degree vision blocks, giving the commander
excellent visibility compared to other contemporary Soviet tank destroyers. 229 As the war
came to a close, some SU-100’s began serving as assault guns alongside their 152mmarmed cousins, participating in street fighting in Berlin working alongside Red Army
infantry. Being a new design, the SU-100’s production and usage continued long after the
Second World War came to a close, but the vehicle is immortalized due to its
contributions in hastening the end of the war and its popularity with its crews.
The IS-2 Heavy Tank:
After encountering the Tiger 1 on the battlefield in 1942, work began on a new Soviet
heavy tank to replace the KV, which was no longer adequate to deal with this new
threat.230 After a number of KV prototypes experimented with new guns and turrets as
stopgap solutions to emerging German armor designs, an entirely new heavy tank, the IS,
or Iosef Stalin tank, entered production. Boasting marked advantages over the older KV,
the IS was to be the Soviets’ new breathrough tank, wielding thick armor, relatively high
speed for a heavy tank, and a massive gun that would enable it to go toe-to-toe with
Germany’s latest heavy tanks, Tiger 1 and Tiger 2. This vehicle would enter mass
production as the IS-2 after several prototype stages. 231 The IS-2 carried the 122mm D25T main gun, capable of penetrating the frontal armor of the Panther from 1.5
kilometers, as well as causing heavy spalling in heavier tanks. 232 Furthermore, due to the
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high caliber this gun possessed an effective high explosive shell, expanding the tank’s
usefulness to include destroying bunkers and other fortifications, as well as enemy
infantry and armor.
In addition to the powerful main weapon, improvements in the armor of the IS-2 over
the older KV series were critically important to ensuring survivability against late-war
German tanks and tank destroyers. However, weight reduction was also prioritized, as the
IS-2 was slated to work in conjunction with the T-34 and other lighter vehicles, so
maintaining reasonable speed was important. To this end most of the armor protection
was shifted to the front of the vehicle where the most hits would be received, creating a
thick front glacis plate 100mm thick and angled at 60 degrees.233 The vehicle was further
protected by 90mm thick side armor and a cast turret of the same thickness, giving the
vehicle excellent protection from the front, and acceptable armor elsewhere. 234 This
improved protection was achieved by reducing the heavier armor at the back of the
vehicle and improving the overall angling and profile, giving IS-2 much greater
protection from enemy fire than preceding designs. The armor was improved further by
modifying the “stepped” profile on early vehicles and shifting to a uniformly angled front
plate instead.235 Despite its improved armor protection, the IS-2 maintained a somewhat
small profile, being shorter than Tiger I or Tiger II and slightly lighter than the Panther,
the most comparable tanks of the day.
In combat the IS performed admirably, as it was able to knock out Tiger Is and Tiger
IIs and occasionally caused them to jettison their turrets in the manner of IS-2’s cousins,
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the SU-152 and ISU-152 heavy tank destroyers.236 Even when its 122mm shells were
unable to penetrate the tanks they faced, the target vehicles would often be disabled with
their tracks destroyed and experience massive spalling, causing any surviving crew to
abandon their vehicles before the next shot landed. The IS-2’s fire rate was admittedly
slow due to its heavy 2-part ammunition but was still accepted into service by Soviet
leadership regardless for its massive blast effect. The gun’s performance was further
improved by deficiencies in German alloys by this point in the war, nickel was being
used as a substitute for manganese in tank armor and this comparatively brittle
construction caused many tanks hit by the IS-2 and other Soviet heavy vehicles to crack
apart upon being struck.237
Arguably representing the pinnacle of Soviet heavy tank design, the IS-2 was an
effective machine that served alongside the T-34 and other vehicles in Red Army tank
battalions from its inception in 1944 through the end of the war, seeing combat in all
major operations on the Eastern Front upon entering service. Although the IS-2 was not
invincible to the heaviest German guns, its unique armor scheme gave it good frontal
protection while its main 122mm gun provided a firm answer to the Tiger I, Tiger II, and
Elefant. After creating breakthroughs in German front lines, IS-2 would work more
closely with more mobile vehicles to exploit the gap in the defenses, following Soviet
Deep Battle philosophy. Though the heavy tank concept would become obsolete shortly
after the end of the war, the IS-2 served the Soviet Union well and gave the Germans a
powerful reminder of Soviet military might.
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To summarize Soviet tank development during the Second World war, tanks designed
from this period were characterized by several innovations including large main guns,
cast components, angled armor, and rugged construction. These features capitalized on
the massive Soviet wartime industry and readily available supplies of steel and workers
to create thousands of rugged vehicles that could be cast at German lines en-masse to
bring about the strategic breakthroughs called for by the Deep Battle philosophy. Though
casualty rates were extremely high for Soviet tank crews, their vehicles were effective,
and often innovative, introducing new, cheap methods of construction and combat that
could be readily mass-produced. Furthermore, Soviet vehicles were characterized by their
generally higher top speed than their German opponents, and lack of creature comforts
and general polish. This decision was made due to the incessant need for more tanks on
the Eastern front and low survivability of many light vehicles and the T-34 in combat.
Many Soviet vehicles of the early war period used innovative designs, such as T-34 and
KV-1, but were severely hampered by poor crew training, maintenance, ineffective
leadership and strategic level planning, and a serious dearth of communications
equipment. As a result, they were unable to significantly halt the German invasion during
Operation Barbarossa. Additionally, Germany developed heavier vehicles to counter the
T-34 and KV, the Soviet Union had no real answer or dedicated anti-heavy tank destroyer
until the SU-152, which was pressed into this role after discovering its capability largely
by accident. However, the ability to destroy the heaviest German tanks with a
comparatively cheap and easy-to-produce vehicle would not go unnoticed, and the ISU152 was produced in greater numbers and served as an effective heavy tank killer through
the end of the war. Finally, Soviet tank design culminated with the IS-2 heavy tank,
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reducing the weight from the archaic KV in favor of an optimized heavy tank design
capable of going toe-to-toe with Nazi Germany’s heaviest vehicles.
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Conclusion:
To conclude, it is clear that the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union presented an existential
threat to the Soviet peoples due to their rapid mechanized advance and the gusto with
which the Nazis carried out their campaign of genocide. After sweeping through lightly
defended Soviet lands, the Nazis set about killing or enslaving any civilians or Red Army
troops caught in their path in their efforts to expand the Third Reich. Soviet forces
meanwhile were poorly organized and put up only token resistance, despite suffering
millions of men and thousands of vehicles as casualties. After finally halting the Nazi
advance during the winters of 1941 and 1942, the Soviet Union gradually began making
critical changes to their armored doctrine that allowed them to push the Nazis back. The
Soviet Union refocused their tank design from interwar light tanks to the heavier and
better-armored T-34, producing massive quantities of these jack-of-all-trades vehicle
from factories evacuated from western districts of the USSR. Additionally, the
rediscovery of Deep Battle doctrine allowed the USSR to coordinate better at the
strategic level and put their massive numbers of tanks to effective use. Alongside the T34, cost-effective, multipurpose vehicles such as the SU-76, SU-152, ISU-152, and IS-2
provided the arms and armor necessary to conduct effective armored assaults against the
might of the Wehrmacht. The need for heavier vehicles for both sides intensified
throughout the conflict as both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union raced to establish
armored supremacy on the battlefield. The Wehrmacht placed the emphasis of their
armored vehicles primarily upon thicker armor and extremely accurate 88mm main
armaments, but these vehicles suffered severe mechanical issues due to overburdened
engines and collapsing supply lines. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union focused their
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production efforts on armored vehicles that were simple to produce and provided
moderately effective, low-cost solutions to the issues presented by Nazi Germany’s
sophisticated tanks designs. Additionally, the extensive use of the radio in Soviet vehicles
gave them the coordinating ability necessary to operate armored vehicles in coordination
in battle. Communication was a severe problem for Soviet tank crews in the beginning of
the war that was largely rectified with later vehicle models. Finally, the extensive use of
the medium tank and maneuverable heavy vehicles by the Soviet Union proved to be an
important step towards the development of the modern main battle tank. The T-34-85
proved that a single vehicle could combine effective armor, weaponry, and speed into a
single platform, signaling the end of tank classes as universal tanks became a battlefield
norm in the postwar period. Further, the extensive use of angled armor in Soviet vehicles
provided a cost-effective way to improve a vehicle’s protection without adding material
and this technique is still in use in the modern era. Though the Soviet Union suffered tens
millions of casualties as a result of the war, it is clear that their armored forces provided
the muscle the Red Army needed to beat back Nazi Germany and end the reign of
Hitler’s panzers on the battlefields of Europe.
Further, the extensive developments to tank design and doctrine had long-lasting
effects in the postwar period that still resonate today. The shift in tank doctrine away
from heavy tanks and towards medium/universal vehicles via machines like the T-34-85
and Panther was an important step towards the development of the modern main battle
tank. Additionally, Nazi Germany’s largest vehicles used so much steel armor that they
became impractical to drive for any distance, namely machines like the Tiger II,
Jagdtiger, and Maus super heavy tanks. The fact that there was a clear upper limit on how
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much armor could be applied to a tank before the engine to move such weight could no
longer be mounted within the vehicle despite ever-advancing gun technology indicated
that rolled homogenous steel armor was not a viable solution for future vehicles. This led
to the development of modern composite armors used on battle tanks today, which
provide the equivalent of hundreds of millimeters thick protection that World War 2-era
tankers could only dream of.
Finally, the Soviet Union’s massive industrial capacity geared squarely towards
armored vehicle development played a critical role in the superpower’s military strategy
in the early Cold War, namely the assumed supremacy of their ground forces due to the
sheer number of tanks the USSR could produce and field. This was a centerpiece of
Soviet defense/standoff doctrine until the USSR developed their own nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, a proud legacy of tank development exists in the Russian Federation today,
with cutting-edge designs such as the T-90 carrying on the legacy of their T-34 forebears.
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